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ABSTRACT 
NEW INSIGHTS INTO CORRUPTION: PARADOXICAL EFFECTS OF  
APPROACH-ORIENTATION FOR POWERHOLDERS. 
FEBRURARY 2013 
 
MINDI S. ROCK, B.A., OBERLIN COLLEGE 
 
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor Ronnie Janoff-Bulman 
 
Does power lead to corruption (Kipnis, 1972), and if so, why? Here, a novel mechanism 
is proposed for understanding the complex relationship between power and corruption by 
incorporating recent work on morality (Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009). By 
bridging the power, self-regulation, and morality literatures we proposed that powerful 
individuals, because of their approach tendencies, are oriented more towards moral 
prescriptions or “shoulds” and thus focus more on moral acts and moral intentions while 
minimizing the importance of moral proscriptions (neglect pathway). We proposed an 
alternative path to corruption for powerholders via moral self-regard. Powerholders, 
because of their approach-based moral focus, would experience an automatic boost of 
implicit moral self-regard that would license future immorality. In three studies we found 
suggestive evidence that the approach tendencies of participants primed with power 
maximized the role of good moral acts and intentions and minimized the impact of moral 
transgressions, because the individual’s monitoring system focused on and valued 
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instances of moral successes rather than moral failures (neglect pathway). We did not 
find support for the moral self-regard pathway.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
When considering the relationship between power and morality one’s thoughts 
naturally turn to corruption.  One reason for this intuitive link between power and 
corruption is that there are numerous examples of powerful individuals who display poor 
or no moral judgment, such as disgraced Governors Eliot Spitzer and Rod Blagojevich 
and corrupt financier, Bernard Madoff.  Past research in psychology has broadly explored 
whether power leads to corruption (Kipnis, 1972), but a less examined question concerns 
specific psychological processes that underlie why powerholders may commit moral 
transgressions.  The current research offers a theoretical framework for the relationship 
between power and corruption by incorporating recent work on moral regulation (Janoff-
Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009) as a possible mechanism. 
In this research we investigated potential mechanisms by which power leads to 
corruption.  As discussed below, we do not believe power necessarily leads to corruption, 
but rather that power produces certain “vulnerabilities” to corruption.  More specifically, 
we argue that power activates a type of moral regulation that influences how 
powerholders attend to and evaluate their good and bad behavior, which, ironically, 
makes them more likely to commit moral transgressions.  Self-regulation research helps 
to explain the paradoxical process of powerholders’ evaluations of moral acts, and we 
argue that it is their approach orientation, which promotes a focus on moral goods over 
immoral deeds, that deserves special attention.  
To account for the considerable range of findings in the power literature, Keltner, 
Gruenfeld, and Anderson (2003) proposed an integrative framework based on self-
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regulation for high versus low powerholders.  The authors’ framework suggests that 
having power is associated with increased rewards and freedom, which promotes 
approach-related motivation.  In contrast, reduced power is associated with increased 
threat, punishments, and constraints, and activates avoidance or inhibition-related 
motivation.  More broadly, having power is linked to an increased focus on positive end 
states and activates approach tendencies, whereas reduced power is associated with an 
increased focus on negative end states and activates inhibition tendencies.  
Recent work by Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, and Hepp (2009) extended this 
fundamental regulatory distinction of approach versus avoidance to the moral domain.  
Their research examined whether individuals hold different and opposing moral goals, 
which reflect promoting (approaching) morality versus avoiding (inhibiting) immorality.  
In their model, moral prescriptions represent a distinct mode of regulation that focuses on 
behaviors that individuals should engage in to be moral, such as helping a friend, working 
hard, and volunteering time to a charity.  Moral proscriptions represent a mode of 
regulation that focuses on behaviors individuals should not engage in to avoid 
immorality, such as cheating, lying, and stealing.  Overall, prescriptive and proscriptive 
moral regulation offer insights into the fundamental difference between activating “good” 
behaviors versus inhibiting “bad” behaviors, and we propose that this framework sheds 
new light on the link between power and corruption.   
In the current project we explored two paths by which the approach tendencies of 
powerholders may lead to corruption.  The first pathway involves the under-regulation of 
the proscriptive system and a minimization of immoral acts and intentions.  This leads to 
the relative neglect of immoral behavior.  The second pathway features the over 
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regulation of the prescriptive system and involves an automatic boost in moral self-
regard.  Monitoring for moral “hits” such as good actions and behaviors may reward 
moral thoughts and intentions and lead to increased moral self-regard. This in turn may 
license future immorality.  Ironically, in both cases, we predicted that powerholders’ 
approach-based moral orientation would increase the likelihood of corruption. 
A corollary hypothesis to consider is the link between lacking power and moral 
regulation.  Keltner et al. (2003) suggest that lacking power heightens one’s focus on 
negative end states that include threat, punishment and social constraints, and thus 
activates inhibition tendencies.  Lacking power should regulate moral behavior by 
focusing primarily on proscriptions--what they “should not” be doing to avoid being 
immoral–which could lead to fewer moral transgressions.  However, we believe there are 
additional, complex factors to be considered in understanding the impact of low power on 
moral or immoral outcomes.  Thus the powerless may have particular concerns about 
injustices or special sensitivities towards others in need. In other words, we do not 
believe that the relationship between morality and the lack of power is a simple mirror of 
the relationship between morality and having power, and we believe these warrant 
independent explorations.  The current research therefore focused on power and 
powerholders, self-regulatory orientations, and their possible links to corruption. 
Power 
What is power? 
The concept of power has proven challenging for researchers to capture in a 
singular definition.  To paraphrase Bierstedt’s (1950) insightful commentary on this 
issue, humans have a lay understanding of power, but when asked what it is precisely, a 
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definition is elusive.  Some researchers consider the broadest features of power to be the 
ability to act upon the environment or another individual, while simultaneously remaining 
unconstrained by these external sources (e.g., Bugental & Lin, 2001; Cartwright, 1959; 
Hollander, 1985; Fiske & Dépret, 1996; Guinote, 2007; Keltner, et al., 2003; Weber, 
1947).  Some examples of language that communicates this definition include Dahl’s 
(1957) description of power as “the ability to compel others to do what you want them to 
do” and Thibaut and Kelly’s (1959) “power over.”  Others look to the importance of 
influence, defining power in terms of “capacity or potential to influence, modify or 
control others’ states” (Copeland, 1994; Emerson, 1962; Fiske, 1993; French & Raven, 
1959; Imai, 1993; Manz & Gioia, 1983; Parker & Rubenstein, 1981; Rusbult, Verette, 
Whitney, Slovik, & Lipkus, 1991; Thibaut et al., 1959).  
The current research focused on the social nature of power, with an eye towards 
individuals in power who exercise their ability to influence with the intent to gain certain 
outcomes.  The simplest and most frequently used definition of power that conveys this 
meaning is “outcome control.”  In a given interaction the high power individual makes 
decisions that determine the outcomes of a target (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Copeland, 
1994; Emerson, 1962; Fiske, 1993; French et al., 1959; Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 
2003; Guinote, 2007; Imai, 1993; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Lammers, 
Stoker, & Stapel, 2009; Manz et al., 1983; Overbeck & Park, 2001; Parker et al., 1981; 
Rusbult et al., 1991; Thibaut et al., 1959). Additionally, powerful individuals have 
increased access to resources (money, rewards, knowledge, prestige), which frees their 
thoughts and actions from ordinary restrictions (Keltner, et al., 2003).  Past and present 
research offers examples of experiments in which power is operationalized using 
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outcome control, and the current research relied on this definition, as it is most relevant to 
this work.   
To test the effects of power, empirical research has used both explicit (e.g., 
narrative priming and assigned power roles) and implicit (e.g., subliminal lexical 
priming) tasks to manipulate one’s experience of power.  Galinsky, Gruenfeld, and 
Magee (2003) established the use of narrative priming to explore whether simply 
recalling an experience of power produced the same results as being assigned a position 
of power.  In their research, the narrative prime included three between-subjects 
conditions and individuals had three minutes to remember a personally relevant 
experience with social power.  High power participants wrote about a time when they had 
control over someone else, low power participants wrote about a time when someone else 
controlled them, and participants in the control condition wrote about the previous day.  
The essays were then coded for how much power participants reported having. Galinsky, 
Gruenfeld, and Magee (2003) found that individuals described themselves as having 
more power in the high power narrative prime condition compared to those in the low 
power narrative prime condition. The authors noted that the control condition was not 
coded for power, because very few individuals wrote about an experience of power.    
Another effective method used to explicitly prime power involved assigning 
participants to specific power roles, such as boss or employee.  Galinsky, Gruenfeld, and 
Magee (2003) used this approach in their research as well; first participants were asked 
about past leadership experience and then were randomly assigned to either high or low 
power roles (e.g., manager or subordinate).  To measure the effect of power role 
assignment, participants answered several questions including how much they felt they 
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were in charge of the task and to what extent they had power over the subordinates.  As 
expected, their results revealed significant differences between the high and low power 
roles, such that individuals in the high power roles reported feeling much more control 
over both the task and subordinates. Both methods have been validated with a variety of 
participant samples (see also Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Guinote, 2007; Smith & Bargh, 
2008: Smith & Trope, 2006).  
In addition to explicit measures, researchers have also developed subliminal 
techniques to prime power, such as scrambled word, sentence-fragments completion, and 
scrambled-sentence tasks (see Chen, Lee-Chai & Bargh, 2001; see also Bargh & 
Chartrand, 2000; Smith & Trope, 2006).  In one example, Smith and Trope (2006) used a 
scrambled-sentence task that presented participants with five words from which they 
were to construct a grammatically correct sentence using four of the words.  The 
researchers provided a sample sentence containing the words: juicy, are, the, oranges, 
ripe, with one possible solution being, “The oranges are ripe.” During the experiment, 
participants unscrambled 16 sets of words with half of the sets containing target words 
related to high power, low power, or control primes.  Target words for the high power 
condition included authority, captain, commands, controls, dominates, executive, 
influenced, privileged.  The low power condition included words relevant to lacking 
power such as complied, janitor, obey, passive, servant, submits, subordinate, yield.  The 
control condition contained 16 sets of power-irrelevant words.  Smith and Trope (2006) 
confirmed that the sentence-scramble task produced comparable power differences to the 
explicit power primes. 
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The Influence of Power 
Past researchers have studied a range of psychological outcomes associated with 
power.  Some of the known behavioral outcomes include initiating more physical contact 
(Henley, 1973) and speaking more (Dovidio, Brown, Heltman, Ellyson, & Keating, 
1988).  
Attention to Rewards 
 Elevated power increases an individual’s sensitivity to rewards and opportunities 
(Keltner, Anderson, & Gruenfeld, 2003).  According to this reasoning, powerful people 
should be quicker to detect opportunities for material and social rewards.  This prediction 
is supported by Higgins’s (1997) assertion that approach is facilitated by the direction of 
attention toward rewards and means for obtaining those rewards.  Further research has 
revealed several correlates of behavioral approach are associated with attention to 
rewards, including increased dopamine (DePue, 1995).  
 Evidence supporting the prediction that power increases sensitivity to rewards and 
opportunities comes from work using Thematic Apperception Tests (TATs; Atkinson, 
1964) to measure need to approach.  This line of work reveals that individuals in group 
leadership roles (Zander & Forward, 1968), European Americans compared with African 
Americans (Adkins, Payne, & Ballif, 1972) and children from higher status social groups 
(Nygard, 1969), all demonstrate high levels of the need to approach, which detects 
sensitivity to rewards.  Another related finding is that elevated power increases 
perceptions of rewards and opportunities in ambiguous interactions and acts.  Work that 
supports this prediction comes from men who occupy positions of power and perceive 
sexual interest in women’s ambiguous behavior (Abbey, 1982; Keltner et al., 1998). 
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Positive Affect 
There is a growing literature on the influence of power on affect (Berdahl & 
Martorana, 2006; Clark, 1990; Collins, 1991; Kemper, 1991; Tiedens et al., 2000). 
Keltner et al. (2003) posited that elevated power increases the experience and expression 
of positive affect including discrete emotions such as desire, enthusiasm, and pride.  In 
contrast, reduced power is predicted to cause negative emotion and anxiousness including 
the discrete emotions fear, shame, awe and embarrassment.  
To test the relationship between power and affect, Anderson, Langner, and 
Keltner (2001) asked participants to report their general sense of power (e.g., “I 
experience power in my day to day life) and their general tendency to experience 
different emotions.  Their work showed that power correlated with the increased 
experience of many positive emotions (e.g., amusement, desire, enthusiasm, happiness, 
and love). Other research suggests that power influences expressive behavior.  Using a 
fraternity hierarchy, the individual’s power was defined by their position in the fraternity: 
active brother (high power) versus recent pledge (low power). Keltner et al. (1998) found 
that high power members were more likely to display smiles of pleasure than were low 
power members.   
Additional research by Berdahl and Martorana’s (2006) manipulated power and 
measured the effect on expressed affect.  Using Keltner et al.’s (2003) framework, 
Berdahl and Martorana predicted that having power would increase the experience and 
expression of positive emotions and that lacking power would increase the expression of 
negative emotions. In their study, power was primed by randomly assigning participants 
to power roles allegedly based on careful evaluation of a leadership questionnaire.  
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Following role assignment, the experimenter brought groups of three research 
participants into individual rooms to complete a discussion task. The leader was 
responsible for managing the discussion about a social issue and recording the agreed 
upon group opinion. Following this group interaction, both leaders and subordinates 
completed a post-discussion question that asked about their feelings of power and their 
expression of emotion during group interactions.  Berdahl and Martorana found that 
leaders experienced more positive emotions, such as happiness and interest, compared to 
subordinates who reported experiencing more negative emotions such as contempt, 
discomfort, disgust, embarrassment, fear, guilt and shame.  
Automatic Cognition 
Social cognition work demonstrates that individuals with power pay less attention 
to others, while relying more on stereotypes (Fiske, 1993; Goodwin, Operario, & Fiske, 
1998; Keltner & Robinson, 1996, 1997).  Fiske’s (1993) “power as control (PAC) model” 
theorizes that high power roles, such as bosses, stereotype low power roles, such as 
employees, for three reasons: increased cognitive load, lack of outcome dependency, and 
self-selection of high power roles.  High power individuals may experience increased 
cognitive load because of their high number of responsibilities, and in order to promote 
efficiency high power individuals may utilize cognitive shortcuts, including stereotypes 
and heuristics.  Second, the outcomes of high power individuals are not dependent on low 
power individuals, so there is less motivation to pay attention to low power individuals.  
Finally, high power roles may attract individuals with dominant personalities, and these 
individuals may be more likely to stereotype subordinates.  Other research finds that 
powerholders pay less attention to low power targets, resulting in less individuation and 
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greater use of stereotypes (Fiske, 1993; Goodwin, Operario, & Fiske, 1998; Goodwin, 
Gubin, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 2000; Keltner & Robinson, 1996, 1997).  Additionally, 
Gruenfeld (2005) found that when primed with power individuals use less systematic 
social cognition and less complex cognitive processing (cf. Guinote, 2007, on power and 
attentional flexibility).   
Disinhibition Effects 
 Interestingly, recent work reveals that across different social contexts power is 
often associated with socially inappropriate and disinhibited behavior.  Work by Keltner 
and Ward (1998) focused on how priming power affects socially appropriate behavior 
(e.g., eating).  Participants were brought into a lab and told to discuss several contentious 
social issues.  One participant was randomly assigned to the high power role that required 
him or her to assign points to two other participants based on their contributions to 
written policy recommendations.  Partway through the study the experimenter returned 
with a plate of five cookies.  Given that each group consisted of three participants each 
person could take a single cookie.  Of interest was which individual would consume a 
second cookie.  Consistent with their predictions, Keltner and Ward (1998) reported that 
participants assigned to the high power role were more likely to take a second cookie. 
Along with consuming more cookies, coded video interactions revealed that high power 
participants were also more likely to chew with their mouths open and have crumbs on 
their face and table.  
Work in support of disinhibited behavior includes Gonzaga and Keltner’s (2001) 
investigation of the behavioral influence of power in sexual contexts.  In their 
experiment, participants were coded for exhibiting two categories of behavior in a face-
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to-face interaction: disinhibition and flirtatiousness.  Typical behaviors included 
provocative eye contact, touches, forward leans, coy glances, and neck presentations.  
Consistent with their predictions, powerful individuals were more disinhibited and 
flirtatious compared to those without power.  There were no significant sex differences, 
suggesting that high power men and women demonstrated similar disinhibited behavior.  
Likewise, Henley (1973) found that touch privilege is correlated with status, such that 
high power is associated with increased attempts to initiate physical contact.  
Another theme of socially inappropriate outcomes includes violations of 
politeness norms.  DePaulo and Friedman (1998) found that high power individuals were 
more likely to talk, interrupt, and speak out of turn in an organizational context.  Drawing 
from a survey of approximately 750 employees, participants reported that rude and 
disrespectful behaviors were three times as likely to come from individuals higher up in 
the company.  Further, Dovidio, Brown, Heltman, Ellyson, and Keating (1988) reported 
that in a discussion task, individuals randomly assigned to high power roles spoke twice 
as much as those assigned to low power roles.   
Taken together, past research in the power literature demonstrates important 
downstream effects of power on affect, behavior and cognition. Power is associated with 
attention to rewards, positive affect, cognitive automaticity, and disinhibited behavior.  In 
the following section we review theory and research by Keltner and his colleagues (2003) 
that integrates these findings into a unified framework. 
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Power as Approach 
Self-Regulation 
A fundamental distinction in psychology concerns the difference between 
approach and avoidance.  This distinction is central to motivation theory and research and 
has been successfully applied to many areas within psychology, from personality (Elliot 
& Thrash, 2002; Emmons, 1996; Markus & Nurius, 1996) to neuroscience (e.g., Gray, 
1982, 1990; Sutton & Davidson, 1997).  A substantial body of research provides 
abundant evidence for the distinction between approaching positive outcomes versus 
avoiding negative outcomes.   
Carver and Scheier (1998) proposed that behavior is guided by two opposing 
orientations: an approach orientation that is focused on achieving desired goals and an 
avoidance orientation that is aimed at avoiding anti-goals.  Work in neuroscience has 
identified independent motivational systems based on the response to signals of reward 
and punishment; in particular, a distinction has been made between a behavioral 
activation system (BAS) and a behavioral inhibition system (BIS] (e.g., Gray, 1982, 
1990; Sutton & Davidson, 1997), and Carver and his colleagues (Carver & Scheier, 1998; 
Carver & White, 1994) present the BIS and BAS as the two fundamental components of 
self-regulation. Though represented in various forms, the underlying characteristic of 
each distinction is essentially the same: an approach motivation is sensitive to positive 
outcomes and involves moving towards, activating and promoting, whereas an avoidance 
motivation is sensitive to negative outcomes and involves restraining and inhibiting. 
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In sum, approach and avoidance regulation differ in focus and action tendency.  
Approach tendencies are sensitive to positive end states and involve activation. Inhibition 
tendencies are sensitive to negative end states and involve restraint.   
Power as Approach Regulation 
An important assumption of the current research is based on Keltner, Gruenfeld, 
and Anderson’s (2003) proposition that “power – influences the relative balance of the 
tendencies to approach and inhibit” (p. 268).  Their theory suggests that power involves 
reward-rich environments and freedom from constraints that trigger positive affect, 
automatic cognition, disinhibited behavior, and is related to general increased approach 
tendencies and decreased inhibition tendencies 
In their work examining the action tendencies of powerholders, Galinsky, 
Gruenfeld, and Magee (2003) found that in ambiguous situations powerholders were 
more likely to take action, a reflection of approach tendencies.  To test the action 
tendencies of powerholders, the researchers created a clever blackjack scenario, which 
challenged players to get as close to 21 without going over. The experimental design 
included priming power by placing participants in a structural position of power as either 
the manager or a subordinate.  Participants assigned to the manager position were led to 
believe that they would evaluate and direct the subordinates on a Lego building task. 
After the explanation of the power roles, but before the Lego task, participants completed 
the blackjack scenario. Participants were dealt a hand of cards totaling 16 that required 
asking for an additional card to get closer to 21 or staying with the original hand. Of 
interest was whether the priming influenced the individual’s strategy to “hit,” taking 
action to get closer to 21, or “stay.”  In line with their predictions, Galinsky et al. (2003) 
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found that the high power group of managers “hit” significantly more than the low power 
group.  This lends support to the claim that power increases the tendency to take action.  
In a replication of the influence of power on action tendencies, the authors found that 
high power participants were twice as likely to take physical action against an annoying 
stimulus (e.g., turn off a fan blowing in their face) compared to those primed with low 
power.  
Further evidence of the influence of power on action tendencies comes from 
Anderson and Galinsky’s (2006) investigation of risk estimates.  Participants were 
divided into two groups based on the amount of power they had in their relationships. 
Then they were asked to estimate the chances that certain events, both positive and 
negative, would occur in their lives. Participants primed with power estimated lower 
numbers of fatalities from the causes of death than people primed with low power.  The 
study suggests that when people have power, they are not only more optimistic about 
risks inherent in their own life, but also about risks in the world in general. 
Importantly, having power is not only about increasing one’s approach 
tendencies, but also about decreasing inhibition tendencies.  Disinhibition involves acting 
on one’s own desires in a social context without considering the effects of one’s actions.  
In motivational terms, Keltner, Gruenfeld, and Anderson (2003) argue that disinhibition 
is a byproduct of approach tendencies in which the balance of motivation shifts towards 
failure to inhibit behaviors.  They note that those with power are more likely to go after 
what they want (i.e., approach rewards), and in doing so they are less likely to attend to 
others and to act in socially inappropriate ways.   
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To illustrate disinhibited behavior in everyday life, Gruenfeld (Rigoglioso, 2003) 
provides an anecdote of a famous magazine publisher’s behavior:  
“He had in his office a small refrigerator within arm’s reach of his 
desk. As far as I could tell, there were only two things in there: a 
bottle of vodka and a bag of raw onions. While we were meeting, he 
would reach over, open the door, drink vodka straight out of the 
bottle, and eat onions. […] He seemed to think it was perfectly 
appropriate to do this in a meeting.” (Rigoglioso, 2006) 
 
The relationship between power and disinhibition provides an important connective 
thread to understanding how power may lead individuals to engage in immoral acts.  As 
illustrated in Keltner and Ward’s experiment, powerholders were less concerned with 
social consequences and were uninhibited in their actions.  We propose that disinhibition 
may play a role in powerholders’ tendencies to commit immoral or corrupt acts without 
incurring damage to their moral self-image.  It is powerholders’ approach orientation that 
focuses the individual on rewarding moral actions (i.e., prescriptions) without 
concentrating on inhibiting immoral behavior (i.e., proscriptions).  In this way, the 
balance of motivational tendencies shifts towards increased approach tendencies and 
decreased inhibition tendencies and may ultimately promote overlooking immoral 
behavior.     
 The current research built upon past work that associated power with increased 
approach and decreased inhibition tendencies (Keltner, Gruenfeld & Anderson, 2003). 
The next section will review literature concerning the proposed mechanism, moral 
regulation, for the current set of studies.    
Power and Morality 
As mentioned in the opening section of this paper, intuitively there seems to be a 
direct connection between power and corruption, and this was the thesis of Kipnis’s 
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(1972) seminal research.  Kipnis questioned whether having power would produce 
significant behavioral changes in the powerholder, with a particular focus on corrupt 
consequences. To empirically test this question, Kipnis designed a business simulation in 
which all participants, who were Temple University business students, were assigned to 
supervise a group of teenagers in a separate building.  Kipnis showed that participants 
who were given control over resources (e.g., pay increase or deductions) made more 
attempts to influence the subordinates than those who did not control resources.  The 
managers subsequently undervalued the subordinates’ performance, attributed the 
subordinates’ efforts to their own control rather than subordinates’ motivations, and 
sought increased distance from the subordinates.  
Other researchers have also sought to understand whether power necessarily leads 
to negative outcomes.  Some of the findings suggest that powerful individuals are more 
likely to distribute rewards to favor their own powerful group (Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 
2001) and to attend to information that confirms their expectations (Copeland, 1994).  As 
discussed in an earlier section, Fiske’s (1993) “power as control (PAC) model” proposed 
that high power roles stereotype low power roles, which “justify the system of 
inequality.” (p.182).   
However, findings on the topic of power leading to negative consequences are not 
consistent, and several researchers find that under certain conditions powerful individuals 
exhibit superior individuation and less reliance on stereotyping (Overbeck & Park, 2001; 
Ric, 1997; Louche, 1982) and also do not display in-group favoritism in reward 
distribution  (Ng, 1982).  Although power does not necessarily lead to corruption and 
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behavioral transgressions, we nevertheless believe it may make such outcomes more 
likely.   
Morality 
 Thus far we have presented past empirical links between power and self-
regulation with specific evidence highlighting the relationship between power and 
approach tendencies.  Self-regulation provides a parsimonious explanation of multiple 
psychological outcomes associated with power, but does not completely explain the 
relationship between power and corruption.  Corruption is broadly defined as immoral 
behavior and includes such actions as lying, cheating, and stealing.  Therefore, the 
current analysis integrates research on self-regulation and morality as a way to 
understand how power may lead to corruption and, specifically, moral transgressions.  
Recent research by Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, and Hepp (2009; also see Janoff-Bulman, 
2011; Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010, Rock & Janoff-Bulman, 2010) focused on 
distinguishing between dual moral obligations of “not harming others” versus “helping 
others,” which they suggest reflect separate systems of motivation and self-regulation.  
The current analysis proposes that moral regulation, focusing on good acts or avoiding 
bad acts, offers an alternative way to understand the relationship between power and 
corruption.  Our aim is to test powerholders’ evaluation of moral and immoral acts, and 
whether their sensitivity to the two systems of moral regulation predict differential 
judgments of and engagement in corrupt behaviors.  
Two Systems of Moral Regulation: Prescriptive versus Proscriptive 
As a set of rules that facilitate group living, morality acts as a compass, helping 
individuals navigate social situations by offering guidelines as to “how we should or 
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should not behave in order to be valued members of society” (De Waal, 1996, p.10).  
Moral judgments are based on beliefs about what is right and wrong, and moral behavior 
characterizes a person as good or bad (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009).  As discussed earlier, 
central to motivation theory and research is the distinction between approaching positive 
outcomes versus avoiding negative outcomes.  In the moral realm, approach and 
avoidance regulatory strategies parallel the two primary motives underlying parental 
responsibility: providing children with the means to survive and protecting them from 
harm (Janoff-Bulman & Sheikh, 2006; also see Bowlby, 1969; Higgins, 1997).  In a 
group context, approach-avoidance motivation functions by regulating group behavior: 
advancing (i.e., approaching) desirable behaviors to promote group well-being and 
inhibiting (i.e., avoiding) dangerous, undesirable behaviors.  
Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, and Hepp (2009) propose that past work provides 
suggestive evidence for two systems of morality based on motivation and self-regulation, 
and in a series of seven studies they provide evidence for these two systems.  One moral 
system, labeled “prescriptive morality,” is based on activation motivation and focuses on 
what we should do. The other moral system, labeled “proscriptive morality,” is based on 
inhibition motivation and focuses on what we should not do. Further, prescriptive 
morality involves activation and specifically engaging in moral actions.  Proscriptive 
morality, in contrast, involves inhibition and specifically restraining from immoral 
behaviors. (Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009).  Following from these separate 
motivational bases, prescriptive and proscriptive morality involve different behaviors. 
Prescriptive morality entails behaviors that promote well-being and includes acts of 
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charity and assistance. Proscriptive morality entails inhibiting harmful actions and 
restraining behaviors that may violate group norms, such as cheating, lying and stealing. 
Janoff-Bulman et al. (2009) profile the differences between prescriptive and proscriptive 
morality in terms of linguistic representation, priming sensitivity, judgments of personal 
preference, and moral crediting and disapproval.  Overall, prescriptive morality, a focus 
on “shoulds,” is represented more abstractly and involves inclusivity to maximize success 
by engaging in moral acts; proscriptive morality, a focus on “should nots,” is represented 
in more concrete language, to minimize potential failures by engaging in immoral acts.  
Prescriptive morality is regarded as more discretionary and less obligatory;  given that the 
costs of engaging in immoral acts are considerably higher, proscriptive morality is 
perceived as mandatory.  Judgments about engaging in moral and immoral behavior are 
also viewed very differently. Prescriptive moral primes resulted in less disapproval for 
immoral behavior and more credit for moral behavior.  In contrast, proscriptive moral 
prime resuled in stronger disapproval of immoral acts and less credit for morality.   
Overall, prescriptive and proscriptive moral regulation offer insights into the 
fundamental difference between activating “good” behaviors versus inhibiting “bad” 
behaviors, and we propose that this framework sheds new light on the link between 
power and corruption.   
Power and Moral Regulation 
 Following from past research that separately links power and morality with self-
regulation, the current perspective proposed that the joint effect of power and morality 
may provide new insights into why and how power leads to corruption.  Power, which 
involves activation and approach tendencies (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003), 
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should focus individuals on prescriptive morality, involving good behaviors and 
intentions one should engage in to promote morality (Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Shepp, 
2009).  Paradoxically, high power individuals, because of their approach-based 
prescriptive moral orientation, may be predisposed to focus primarily on good moral 
actions, while overlooking damaging immoral behaviors.  In the following sections we 
will put forth two pathways by which high power, because of a focus on prescriptions, 
may lead to corruption.   
Two Paths to Corruption for Powerholders 
A critical feature of self-regulation is the role of monitoring to determine whether 
one is successfully reaching a goal—successfully approaching a positive outcome in the 
case of approach motivation and successfully avoiding a negative outcome in the case of 
avoidance motivation (Carver & Scheier, 1998). As pointed out by Janoff-Bulman 
(2009), the most effective and efficient monitoring involves feature-positive monitoring 
(Klayman & Ha, 1987; Newman, Wolff, & Hearst, 1980), which focuses on the presence 
of evidence rather than its absence (e.g., Coats, Janoff-Bulman, & Alpert, 1996). In the 
case of prescriptive morality, feature-positive monitoring focuses on instances of 
morality—good deeds and positive intentions; these are the “hits” of this approach-based 
regulatory system.  In the case of proscriptive morality, feature-positive monitoring 
focuses on instances of immorality, which are the “hits” of this avoidance-based 
regulatory system.  
 We suggest that one way power may paradoxically lead to corruption is based on 
the information of “what counts most” (i.e. prescriptions) when determining morality. We 
label this route of power to corruption the neglect pathway, and it is characterized by the 
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under-regulation of the proscriptive moral system (see Figure 1).  Power via approach 
maximizes the importance of good deeds and intentions that matter to morality, and 
simultaneously minimizes the importance of bad deeds and temptations that contribute to 
immorality.  This is a processes aided and abetted by the feature-positive monitoring 
processes associated with prescriptive morality and, presumably, power. 
Neglect Pathway 
Specifically, power should elicit approach-based, prescriptive moral regulation 
that monitors for good deeds and actions.  Moreover, power should minimize one’s focus 
on immoral behavior such as stealing, lying and cheating, because these actions don’t fit 
into the category of actions that define and promote one’s morality. They are less relevant 
to one’s own moral self-evaluation.  Here there is over-reliance on a single moral 
regulatory system—prescriptive morality, and this results in under-regulation of immoral 
acts and a failure to inhibit behavioral transgressions.  Put more concretely, consider a 
businessperson who simultaneously donates money to a charity and embezzles company 
money for personal gain.  Theoretically, power should shift the businessperson’s 
attention to actions that promote prescriptive morality (such as donating to charity), 
because power elicits approach-based, moral regulation.  At the same time, the 
businessperson fails to inhibit immoral behavior (e.g., embezzling), because his/her 
prescriptive moral focus minimizes the import of these immoral acts, and thus “allows” 
the person to paradoxically engage in corruption.  Interestingly, the neglect pathway may 
help us better understand the link between power and disinhibition (Keltner, Gruenfeld, 
& Anderson, 2003), because approach tendencies of powerholders contribute to their 
failure to inhibit socially inappropriate behavior. 
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High Moral Self-Regard 
 An alternative route for powerful individuals to engage in corruption is through a 
pathway that is characterized by the belief that they have earned the right to behave 
immorally based on over-regulation of the prescriptive moral system (see Figure 1).  That 
is, powerholders, focused particularly on their positive moral thoughts and deeds, reward 
their positive acts and good intentions with moral credits, which ironically licenses future 
immorality.  Their monitoring system over-represents good thoughts and actions, for 
these are the focus of the regulatory search. 
 In a series of experiments, Monin and Miller (2001) make the counterintuitive 
discovery that expressing morally correct judgments leads individuals to behave less 
morally on a subsequent task.  In their experiment, Monin and Miller (2001) had 
participants make hiring decisions in which the strongest applicant was either a White 
applicant from an all White applicant pool or an African American applicant from a 
mixed race applicant pool.  In the latter condition, White participants were given the 
opportunity to make a moral, anti-prejudiced hiring decision and Monin and Miller were 
interested in whether this moral decision would license the individual to be less moral on 
a follow-up task.  Consistent with their predictions, Monin and Miller (2001) reported 
that participants who made moral decisions in the first task, made less moral decisions in 
the follow up task by recommending a less qualified White applicant for a job in a racist 
police department. Monin and Miller (2001) point out that by establishing anti-racist 
credentials in the first task these participants gave themselves moral permission to 
discriminate on the follow-up task.  Interestingly, the researchers ruled out self-
presentation concerns by rerunning the study as two ostensibly unrelated tasks conducted 
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by different experimenters.  This suggests that individuals keep internal track of their 
moral actions to ensure a balanced moral self-image. This work demonstrates the ironic 
finding that behaving morally one time allows individuals to be less moral later.  
Additional support comes from recent research by Mazar and Zhong (2010) who found 
that individuals who previously demonstrated pro-environmentally conscious behaviors 
(i.e., buying green products) were subsequently more likely to engage in less moral 
behaviors (i.e., cheat on an online game).  
Our second predicted pathway for how power leads to corruption is labeled high 
moral self-regard.  Similar to the neglect pathway, this path begins with a focus on good 
moral deeds and intentions, but unlike the neglect pathway, this focus produces a boost in 
moral self-regard that licenses future immorality.  Specifically, high power should elicit 
approach-based, prescriptive moral regulation that focuses on good deeds and intentions.   
This focus on moral thoughts and actions should produce a boost in moral self-regard; 
each monitoring “hit” is evidence of one’s morality (as opposed to outcomes in the 
proscriptive system, in which each “hit” is evidence of one’s immorality). As Monin and 
Miller (2001) show, this boost in moral self-regard licenses future immoral behavior.  
Although actual moral acts are likely to be particularly valuable, it seems that positive 
intentions alone—thoughts in the absence of deeds—can provide moral credit for those 
with a strong prescriptive orientation like powerholders. Research on self-other biases by 
Pronin and Kugler (2007) found that individuals overvalue thoughts and may ignore 
behavior when engaged in self-evaluations, validating their “good” selves with good 
intentions.  For example, recall the businessperson (as described above) planning to 
donate to a group of charities.  High power focuses attention primarily on this good 
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intention to donate to charities and as a consequence s/he experiences a boost in moral 
self-regard.  This heightened moral self-regard may then ironically produce more 
immoral behavior in the future, and thus the original good moral intention licenses future 
corruption.   
Current Studies 
In the following three studies we explored the role of moral regulation as a 
possible exploratory mechanism for the relationship between power and corruption. 
Specifically, we proposed that powerholders’ approach orientation would activate 
prescriptive moral regulation, which is sensitive to positive moral thoughts and actions,  
and by minimizing a focus on proscriptive regulation and increasing moral self-regard, 
may result in moral transgressions by failing to inhibit immoral (proscriptive) behaviors.  
The following studies tested the two routes to moral transgression, both based in over-
regulation of the prescriptive system. The neglect pathway involves the under-regulation 
of the proscriptive system and consists of a minimization of immoral acts and intentions.  
The high moral self-regard pathway involves an approach-based boost in moral self-
regard that licenses future immoral behavior.  Ironically, in both cases, powerholders’ 
approach-based moral regulation may increase the likelihood of corruption, but the two 
routes represent independent paths from power to corruption.  
 The following studies used three different methodologies to test whether 
powerholders’ approach orientation would activate prescriptive moral regulation that 
paradoxically leads to immoral behavior.  Study 1 focused on establishing that power 
produces approach-based moral regulation and, specifically, valuing prescriptions while 
simultaneously minimizing proscriptions. To test this relationship, we primed participants 
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with power and then measured their preference for prescriptive and proscriptive items 
using self-report survey measures.  Study 2 assessed whether priming power produces an 
automatic approach-based boost of moral self-regard as measured by the Moral Go/No-
go Association Task (MGNAT), a new implicit measure developed by our lab.  Study 2 
used the power manipulation and morality measures from Study 1. Study 3 built upon the 
prior two studies’ findings by testing the relationship between power and prescriptive 
moral regulation using actual behavioral measures of helping and cheating.  After being 
primed with power, participants were asked to complete a behavioral activity of helping 
and cheating (counterbalanced).  Study 3 allowed us to examine whether power is 
associated with specific patterns of helping and cheating, particularly greater levels of 
prescriptive morality and proscriptive immorality. The design allowed us to explore 
whether helping (or cheating) at Time 1 differentially influenced cheating (or helping) at 
Time 2 for those with and without power. Further, this design allowed us to examine 
whether helping (or cheating) at Time 1 differentially influenced scores on the Moral 
Go/No-go Association Task. Taken together, the three studies produced a meaningful 
investigation of the relationship between power, approach-based moral regulation, and 
corruptive consequences.  
Specific hypotheses that were tested in the following studies are: 
1.) Power leads to approach-based moral regulation (i.e., focus on prescriptions).  
2.) Power promotes the overvaluing of moral (prescriptive) behaviors, while 
simultaneously minimizing (i.e., undervaluing) immoral (proscriptive) behaviors 
(neglect pathway).    
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3.) Power (via prescriptive moral regulation) produces an automatic boost in moral 
self-regard that licenses future immoral behaviors (high moral self-regard 
pathway).  
Hypotheses 2 and 3 represent the two possible self-regulatory routes from power to 
corruption. In the research that follows, either, both, or neither of these two hypotheses 
could be supported.   
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CHAPTER 2 
 
STUDY 1: POWER PROMOTES A FOCUS ON APPROACH-BASED MORALITY 
 Study 1 focused on establishing the association between power and prescriptive 
moral regulation using explicit measures of moral judgment.  Using two different self-
report measures, we explored the relationship between power and the extent to which 
participants believed people should or should not engage in moral and immoral 
behaviors.  The two moral judgment measures differed in meaningful ways: the first 
measure of moral dilemmas mixed moral and immoral behaviors in each scenario and 
asked participants to evaluate them together; this is a new measure developed for this 
research.  The second measure separated out moral and immoral behaviors to produce a 
relative preference for prescriptive versus proscriptive moral regulation; this is a measure 
of prescriptive-proscriptive morality developed and used in previous research (e.g., 
Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009; Sheik & Janoff-Bulman, 2010).  We believed it 
was particularly important to include the former measure of morality because it provides 
a realistic context for moral decision-making – that is, a trade-off between moral and 
immoral behaviors in a single situation. 
In Study 1 we hypothesized that powerholders’ approach-based moral regulation 
should produce overvaluing of moral prescriptions (“shoulds”) compared to moral 
proscriptions (“should nots”) across both moral judgment measures.  Specifically, we 
expected that powerholders’ approval of prescriptive behaviors would be higher and their 
disapproval of immoral behavior would be lower compared to participants in low power 
and control groups.  Thus, we aimed to show that power is associated with the 
overvaluing of prescriptions and the minimization (i.e., devaluing) of proscriptions.    
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Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 186 (131 women, 53 men and 2 unspecified) undergraduates 
from the Psychology Department subject pool who received experimental credit for their 
participation. 
Materials 
Power Prime. Participants were primed with type of power (high or low) using an 
autobiographical task (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003). For three minutes 
participants wrote about a time that they had (or did not have) power over another 
individual.  A control group was also included; these participants were asked to describe 
what they did the previous day. 
Moral Dilemma Measure. Participants evaluated a series of moral dilemmas 
involving immoral actions that produced moral outcomes (e.g., receive van for charitable 
organization by providing a receipt for twice the real value to the car dealer who donated 
the van). Participants were asked to imagine themselves as the target person in each 
moral scenario and to consider how they would act.  For example:  
As a manager, you are approached by an employee to sponsor a 
charity event that will provide food and clothing for a local women’s 
shelter. You have already sponsored the maximum number of events 
allowed by your company, but you are still interested in finding a way 
to sponsor the event, so you consider using money from your 
department’s cash account. Although it violates company rules, you 
consider taking money from your department’s cash account to 
sponsor the charity event. 
 
Participants rated 10 moral dilemmas using scales tailored to the individual dilemmas 
(see Appendix 1 for full materials).  Using the example above, participants answered the 
following questions: “Do you sponsor the charity event with money from the 
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department’s cash account?” (responses were given as “yes” or “no”) followed by “Do 
you feel you should/should not use money from the department’s cash account…?” “Do 
you feel it is unacceptable/acceptable to use the department’s money…?” and “What is 
the likelihood that you would use the department’s cash...?”  Using separate 9-point 
scales, participants reported their moral attitude (1= “very strongly should not” to 9 = 
“very strongly should”); acceptability judgment (1=“completely unacceptable” to 9 = 
“completely acceptable”); and likelihood judgment (1 =“not at all likely” to 9 = 
“extremely likely”). The reliabilities for the 10-item scales of moral attitude, acceptability 
and likelihood judgments were .681, .681, and .660.  
Moralisms Scale (Janoff-Bulman, 2009).  This 20-item measure consisted of 10 
prescriptive (PreM) and 10 proscriptive (ProM) items.  Each item described a scenario in 
which the target person is deciding whether or not to engage in a particular behavior.  For 
prescriptive items, these are behaviors the person presumably should engage in to be 
considered moral, whereas for proscriptive items, these are behaviors the person 
presumably should not engage in to be considered moral.   
Prescriptive items represented behaviors involving benevolence or 
industriousness, and included volunteering two hours for a local food drive, working 
especially long and hard to meet a deadline for one’s job, going out to find one’s own 
place after staying with a friend for many weeks in her small apartment, and giving 
money to a homeless person on the street.  The latter scenario, for example, was written 
as follows:  “Mary walks by a homeless man on the street, and he asks if she can spare 
some change.  There’s a local shelter that costs $2.00 a night that Mary knows about.  
Mary could just walk past the homeless man, but considers giving him the $2.00 instead.” 
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Proscriptive scenarios represented behaviors involving personal temptations or 
behaviors that indicate a desire or willingness to disregard social norms.  Scale items 
were informed by the work of Haidt (e.g., Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004) 
and Shweder (Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997) in broadening the traditional 
focus of morality (also see Krebs, 2008).  Examples included “excessive” gambling, 
wearing a skimpy dress to a funeral, painting a house bright pink and purple in a modest, 
well-kept neighborhood, and going into greater debt to purchase an expensive TV.  The 
debt scenario, for example, was written as follows: “Sarah is getting more and more into 
debt with her credit card.  She recently bought lots of expensive new clothes and costly 
furniture for her apartment.  She could start saving her money but instead is thinking of 
buying a very expensive hi-definition TV and going into greater debt.”  This instance is 
intended to draw on moral motives associated with restraint from temptation and self-
indulgence.   
In each case, participants were presented with a target person who is considering a 
particular behavior (a “good” behavior in the case of prescriptive, and a “bad” behavior 
in the case of proscriptive) and was asked to rate the extent to which they viewed the 
decision to be a matter of personal preference (1 = “not at all a matter of personal 
preference” and 9 = “completely a matter of personal preference”) and the extent to 
which they believed the person in the scenario should or should not perform the behavior 
(1 = “feel very strongly he/she should not” to 9 = “feel very strongly he/she should”). The 
reliabilities for PreM and ProM personal preference ratings were .85 and .82, and for the 
PreM and ProM moral weight ratings they were .76 and .77.  
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Moral Esteem Scale. This 8-item scale was an adaptation of the Rosenberg (1962) 
Self-Esteem measure.  Sample items included: “I feel that I am a person of moral self 
worth, at least on an equal plane with others” “All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a 
moral failure, ” “When it comes to morality, on the whole I am satisfied with myself.” 
Participants rated the extent to which they disagree/agree with each item (1 = “very 
strongly disagree” to 7 = “very strongly agree”).  The reliability for Moral Esteem was 
.91. 
Procedure  
Participants took part in an online study that consisted of three priming 
conditions: high power, low power, or control followed by the Moral Dilemmas Scale, 
Moralisms Scale, and standard demographics.  After completing the study, participants 
were thanked for their involvement and given a debriefing document that explained the 
research goals.  
Results and Discussion 
As predicted, high power participants, compared to low power and control, 
indicated greater acceptance of immoral behaviors that lead to moral outcomes; means 
were 4.10 versus 3.51 and 3.55, respectively, F(2, 185) = 5.571, p <.005.  As shown in 
Figure 2, high power participants’ greater acceptance of moral dilemmas provides 
suggestive evidence that high power leads to a focus on prescriptions by overvaluing 
prescriptive moral ends and undervaluing proscriptive immoral means.  Interestingly, 
differences were not found on the other Moral Dilemma subscales, which were likely less 
direct measures of moral judgments.  For example, the should/should not scale may have 
reflected societal rather than personal views while the likelihood scale may have reflected 
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recognition of other factors that contribute to these decisions.  The yes/no item was 
probably too crude to capture moral judgments accurately.1 Moral self-esteem did not 
differ by group and will not be discussed in further analyses. 
We also tested for condition effects on the Moralisms Scale.  We hypothesized 
that high power participants, compared to low power and control, would have higher 
scores for prescriptive morality and lower scores for proscriptive morality. Means were 
computed for the 10 prescriptive (PreM) and 10 proscriptive (ProM) preference and 
moral weight items. ProM scores were subtracted from 10 so that higher scores indicated 
stronger proscriptive orientation. 
Mean scores for PreM and ProM personal preference and moral weight scores did 
not differ by power condition (see Table 1 for means). Therefore, we did not find direct 
confirmation for the prediction that compared to low power and control groups, high 
power participants would have higher prescriptive and lower proscriptive scores on the 
Moralisms Scale. However, a closer look at the correlations between PreM and ProM 
moral weight scores provided some preliminary evidence for hypothesis-supporting 
differences based on power. Interestingly, PreM and ProM moral weight scores were 
uncorrelated for high power (r = .052, n.s.), strongly positively correlated for low power 
participants (r = .372, p<.001) and marginally positively correlated for control (r = .206, 
n.s.).  These divergent correlations shed light on how power may change the relationship 
between these two systems of morality.  For low power individuals, and to some extent 
for control participants as well, prescriptive and proscriptive morality were interrelated; 
                                                
1The Moral Dilemma acceptability subscale was much stronger alone than combined with 
the should/should not, likelihood and yes/no measures, so it will be the sole measure used 
for the remainder of the paper.    
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the desire to engage in moral behavior was associated with the desire to avoid engaging 
in immoral behavior.  In contrast, high power individuals seemed to treat prescriptive and 
proscriptive morality as fairly independent systems; attitudes about moral behaviors did 
not necessarily predict their attitudes towards immoral behaviors.  Importantly, the 
separable nature of prescriptive and proscriptive morality for high power participants 
may help explain why immoral behaviors are viewed as acceptable when they lead to 
moral outcomes.  
As illustrated in Table 2, correlations between PreM and ProM scores and 
acceptability judgments also differed by power condition.  For high power participants, 
PreM scores were positively associated with acceptance of moral dilemmas, but ProM 
scores were negatively associated with these dilemmas.  For low power participants both 
PreM and ProM scores were negatively associated with acceptance of moral dilemmas. 
Similarly, PreM and ProM scores were negatively associated with acceptance of moral 
dilemmas for the control group. We conducted Fischer z-tests to examine if the 
correlations for PreM and ProM scores and acceptability judgments were significantly 
different by power conditions.  The correlation for PreM scores and acceptability 
judgments were significantly different for high and low power (z = 3.31, p<.001) as well 
as high power and control (z = 1.77, p = .038). The correlations for ProM and 
acceptability judgments were marginally different for high and low power (z =-1.14, p = 
.079), but not statistically different for high power and control. These results provide 
additional evidence that priming power may influence how individuals differentially 
emphasize the two systems of morality (prescriptive and proscriptive) when making 
moral judgments.  
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Given the previous results, we examined the joint effect of power and individual 
scores of prescriptive morality to predict acceptance of immoral behavior.  We 
hypothesized that the combined effect of high power and prescriptive morality would be 
associated with greater acceptance of immoral behavior. Hierarchical moderated multiple 
regression was used to predict acceptance of moral dilemma items. In Step 1 the dummy 
coded variables for power condition and prescriptive morality scores were entered. In 
Step 2 the interaction terms for prescriptive morality by power condition were added. The 
control condition was treated as the reference group. The addition of the interaction terms 
at Step 2 indicated that the relationship between acceptance scores and prescriptive 
morality varied across the power conditions, ∆R2 = .06, F(2,180) = 6.22, p = .002.  As 
shown in Figure 3, individuals primed with high power, who also scored relatively high 
on prescriptive morality, were more accepting of immoral behaviors compared to low 
power and control conditions.  
Overall, the findings of Study 1 provide suggestive evidence for the neglect 
pathway as tested by the first and second hypotheses.  We found power led to approach-
based moral regulation and promoted the overvaluing of moral (prescriptive) behaviors 
while simultaneously minimizing immoral (proscriptive) behaviors.  Using the Moral 
Dilemma Measure, we assessed participants’ tolerance of short term immorality 
(proscriptions) to achieve long term moral outcomes (prescriptions).  Consistent with 
hypotheses 1 and 2, high powerholders reported greater acceptance of moral dilemmas 
suggesting that high power activated a type of moral regulation that prioritized 
prescriptions and deprioritized proscriptions.   
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Additional support for the neglect pathway came from the Moralism Scale, which 
provided a relative preference for PreM versus ProM.  We predicted high power 
participants would be higher on PreM and lower on ProM, but did not find this main 
effect. However, correlations between the two systems of morality and the moral 
dilemma measure revealed interesting patterns.  For only high power PreM and ProM 
scores were uncorrelated, which we believe reflects the separable nature of morality for 
powerholders that may help explain why they engage in both altruistic and corrupt 
behaviors without costs to their moral-esteem.  Further, for high power participants 
acceptance of moral dilemmas was associated with PreM not ProM, suggesting that for 
powerholders it was how they felt about prescriptive morality, not proscriptive morality 
that mattered in judging the dilemmas.  Similarly, the interaction between power and 
PreM in predicting acceptability of moral dilemmas revealed that high power participants 
with relatively high PreM scores were most accepting of moral dilemmas. When having 
power is paired with a dispositional prescriptive focus, it produces overvaluing of 
prescriptions and minimization of proscriptions; a prescriptive focus for those without 
high power does not result in a similar acceptance of proscriptive immorality for the sake 
of prescriptive moral outcomes.   
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CHAPTER III 
 
STUDY 2: POWER AND MORAL SELF-REGARD 
Study 2 was designed to examine if priming power automatically shifts 
participants’ moral self-regard and whether this shift influences explicit moral judgments. 
Of particular interest was whether high power individuals experienced enhanced moral 
self-regard that in turn produced over-regulation of prescriptive morality and decreased 
concern for proscriptive moral violations (i.e., moral self-regard pathway). In Study 2 it 
was important to use an implicit measure of moral esteem like the Moral Go/No-go 
Association Task, because people prefer to view themselves as moral, which results in 
high explicit moral esteem scores. We found no differences on explicit moral esteem in 
Study 1; therefore in Study 2 we included both implicit and explicit measures of moral 
esteem.  
Method 
Study 2 attempted to explore the relationship between power and shifts in moral 
self-regard in order to determine whether high moral self-regard could help account for 
the greater acceptance of immoral actions (for moral outcomes) by high power 
individuals, as found in Study 1.  We manipulated power (high, low, and control) using 
the same procedure described in Study 1.  Following the prime, participants completed an 
implicit measure of moral esteem, the Moral Go/No-go Association Task (MGNAT), as 
well as the Moral Dilemmas and Moralisms Scale used in Study 1.   
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Participants 
 Participants were 141 (114 women, 26 men and 1 unspecified) undergraduates 
from the Psychology Department subject pool who received experimental credit for their 
participation.  
Materials 
 Moral Go/No-go Association Task (MGNAT). The original Go/No-go 
Association Task (GNAT; Nosek & Banaji, 2001) was designed to assess an implicit 
attitude or belief by measuring the strength of association between a target category and 
two poles of a given attribute dimension.  The MGNAT was developed by our morality 
lab and is an adaptation of the GNAT designed to assess an individual’s implicit moral 
self-regard. The advantage of using the MGNAT, as opposed to other implicit measures 
(e.g., a measure based on the Implicit Association Task), is that it allowed us to collect 
separate associations for prescriptive and proscriptive bases of moral self-regard.  In the 
MGNAT the target dimensions included “self” (I, me, myself, my, mine) and “other” 
(they, them, their, him, her) with the attribute poles set to “moral” (honest, help, fair, 
care, generous) and “immoral” (lie, cheat, steal, unfaithful, selfish).  In this task, 
participants were exposed to all four types of stimuli: self, other, moral, and immoral.  
After several  practice trials that familiarized participants with each type (12 practice 
trails for each type of stimulus), they completed four critical blocks of 60 trials each.  In 
one block participants were asked to give a “go” response if the word presented fit the 
“moral” or “me” categories, and ignore all other types of words.  Similarly, participants 
were presented with trials me-immoral, other-moral, and other-immoral 
(counterbalanced), and were instructed to ignore all other words except for the specified 
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target words.  A key to this task is that exposure times to these trials were very rapid (a 
matter of milliseconds), and thus errors were very common (and not only counted on by 
researchers, but used in the scoring of the task).  The MGNAT allowed us to measure the 
ease of association (measured in number of errors, with fewer errors indicating greater 
association) when “moral” versus “immoral” words were associated with “self” versus 
“other.” 
Moral Dilemma Measure.  Using the same measure from Study 1, participants 
evaluated 10 moral dilemmas involving immoral actions that produced moral outcomes 
(e.g., receive donated van for charitable organization by providing a receipt for twice the 
real value of the donated van to car dealer). Participants were asked to imagine 
themselves as the target person in each moral scenario and to consider how they would 
act. The reliabilities for the 10-item subscales of moral attitude, acceptability and 
likelihood judgments were .617, .707, and .587, respectively.  
Moralisms Scale (Janoff-Bulman, 2009).  Using the same measure from Study 1, 
participants evaluated 10 prescriptive (PreM) and 10 proscriptive (ProM) items. The 
reliabilities for PreM and ProM personal preference ratings were .795 and .781, and for 
the PreM and ProM moral weight ratings they were .642 and .653.  
Moral Esteem Scale. Using the same scale from Study 1, participants responded 
to the adapted Rosenberg (1962) Self-Esteem measure that included 8 items measuring 
moral esteem. The reliability for Moral Esteem was .869.2 
 
                                                
2We did not find any group differences on explicit moral esteem nor were explicit and 
implicit moral esteem correlated (i.e., d’ prime scores of MGNAT). Correlations between 
explicit moral esteem and d’ prime scores were: self-moral (r = .084, n.s.), self-immoral 
(r = -.152, n.s.), other-moral (r = -.053, n.s.), other-immoral (r = -.039, n.s.), 
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Procedure 
Participants took part in a computer-based laboratory study that consisted of three 
priming conditions, followed by an implicit measure of moral esteem and two explicit 
moral judgment measures.  Power was manipulated using the same narrative priming task 
(Galinsky et al., 2003) described in Study 1 and was directly followed by the Moral 
Go/No-go Association Task (MGNAT).  The MGNAT included four 60-trial blocks of 
word associations.  Afterward, participants completed the Moral Dilemmas and 
Moralisms Scale and standard demographics from Study 1.  Participants were thanked for 
their involvement in the study and given a debriefing document that explained the 
research goals.  
Results and Discussion 
 To test the moral self-regard pathway, we predicted that power would produce 
higher implicit moral regard that would be reflected in greater accuracy in response to 
stimulus words associating “me” and “moral” than when responding to all other pairings 
including: me-immoral, other-moral and other-immoral.  We also expected that for high 
power, moral regard would be related to support of prescriptions and greater acceptance 
of proscriptions on the Moral Dilemma measure. We believed moral esteem would 
mediate the relationship between power and moral judgments, and planned to test for this 
mediation.   
As seen in Figure 4, we replicated the effect from Study 1 that high power 
participants, compared to low power and control, were more accepting of immoral 
behaviors that lead to moral outcomes; means were 3.82 versus 3.28 and 3.68, 
respectively, F(2, 137) = 2.967, p =.055.  Though we replicated the acceptability effect 
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from Study 1, the goal of Study 2 was to determine whether enhanced moral regard 
would account for increased prescriptive decision making by powerholders.  To fully 
address the role of moral regard we turned to the Moral Go/No-go Association Task, a 
measure of implicit moral esteem.  
Analyses of the MGNAT data involved calculating participant d-prime (d’) scores 
for the critical 600ms blocks using procedures outlined in Nosek and Banaji (2001) and 
defined by Green and Swets (1966).  Signal detection theory uses four different response 
types: hits (target stimulus present & correct “go” response); misses (target stimulus 
present & incorrect “no go” response); false alarms (target stimuli absent & incorrect 
“go” response); and correct rejections (target stimuli absent & correct “no go” response). 
Importantly, these four response types differentiate between participants’ correct “go” 
responses (i.e. signal) and incorrect “go” responses (i.e. noise) to determine signal 
sensitivity, d-prime (d’). As described by Nosek and Banaji, “sensitivity is calculated as 
(1) the proportion of hits […] and false alarms [….] each converted to z-scores; (2) a 
difference between z-score values for hits and false alarms is d-prime” (pp. 634).  
We tested the prediction that high power participants would experience enhanced 
moral regard with greater accuracy (i.e., fewer association errors) in response to stimulus 
words for self-moral pairings compared to self-immoral, other-moral and other-immoral 
pairings. Using a repeated measures analysis we compared the four d’prime scores (self-
moral, self-immoral, other-moral, and other-immoral pairings) as within-subject variables 
across the three power conditions (high power, low power, and control).  The condition 
by d’ prime score interaction was not significant, F(2, 135) = 2.188, p =.116.  High power 
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participants, compared to low power and control, were not more accurate on self-moral 
associations compared to the other three association pairings.  
We also tested the prediction that high power participants would be more accurate 
on self-moral pairings compared to low power and control participants.  One-way 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed no effect of power condition on accuracy of self-
moral pairings. That is, high power, low power, and control exhibited roughly equal self-
moral association scores with means of 1.32, 1.15 and .97, respectively. Further 
examination of participant d’ prime scores revealed no significant differences for other-
moral and other-immoral pairings3 based on power group. Since we were not able to 
confirm the prediction that power leads to enhanced moral regard via greater accuracy on 
self-moral pairings we did not have cause to test moral-esteem as a mediator for power 
and acceptability judgments.  
The findings of Study 2 did not provide support for the moral self-regard pathway 
as specified by hypothesis 3--powerholders’ approach-based morality would boost 
implicit moral-esteem, and thus license immoral behaviors and judgments.  Using the 
MGNAT to assess implicit associations, high powerholders were not more accurate in 
their associations for self-moral pairings compared to other pairings, nor were they more 
accurate for self-moral pairing compared to low power and control participants. Further, 
overall correlations between d’ prime scores and acceptability judgments were 
uncorrelated, and there was no association when broken down by power condition.  The 
MGNAT is a relatively new measure developed by our lab and is currently being tested 
                                                
3There was a marginal effect for self-immoral pairings, F (2, 136) = 1.791, p =.060, but 
post hoc analyses revealed that this effect was driven by the control group (M = .685) 
compared to the high and low power groups (Ms = 1.049 and .842, respectively). 
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in a number of studies. Data from other studies (including Study 3 of this project) 
suggests that the MGNAT does provide some sensitivity for picking up differences, but 
perhaps the lack of difference in Study 2 reflects the relative stability of moral esteem.  
In Study 2, having power once again led to more prescriptive decision making—
that is, greater acceptance of proscriptive immorality for the sake of prescriptive moral 
outcomes. Those primed with power seemed to prioritize prescriptive moral outcomes 
and deprioritize proscriptive morality.  However, we did not find evidence that this effect 
was due to higher moral self-regard for those primed with power. In other words the high 
moral self-regard pathway to immorality was not supported by the study’s findings. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
STUDY 3: BEHAVIORAL CONSEQUENCES OF POWER ON  
HELPING AND CHEATING 
 Study 3 built upon the prior two studies’ findings by further testing the 
relationship between power and moral regulation, and by focusing on power-based 
differences in prescriptive and proscriptive morality, explored here through actual 
behaviors. After being primed with power, participants were asked to engage in a 
behavioral activity of helping and cheating (counterbalanced).  By examining the 
relationship between power and the initial (i.e., Time 1) behavior, Study 3 allowed us to 
test whether power is associated with specific patterns of helping and cheating, 
particularly greater levels of prescriptive morality and proscriptive immorality.   
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 1414 (93 women, 30 men and 18 unspecified) undergraduates 
from the Psychology Department subject pool who received experimental credit for their 
participation.  
Materials 
Cheating Task (Vohs & Schooler, 2008). This activity is an extension of previous 
cheating measures (von Hippel, Lakin, & Shakarchi, 2005), which presented participants 
with a real opportunity to cheat on a laboratory task.  Participants were asked to calculate 
20 individually presented mental-arithmetic problems (e.g., 1 + 8 +18 – 12 + 19 – 7 + 17 
                                                
4At the end of Study 3 we asked participants if they were suspicious of the experimental 
tasks or instructions.  We had reason to exclude 12 paricipants from the analyses based 
on suspicion.  However, reanalyzing the data without these participants did not change 
any of the results. Therefore, we are reporting the results from the complete data set.   
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– 2 + 8 – 4 = ?).  Participants were told that the computer program contained a glitch that 
revealed the solution if participants right-clicked their computer mouse. The 
experimenter explained that the researcher would not know if participants right-clicked 
the computer mouse, but that they should try to solve the problems honestly.  In actuality, 
the computer program was designed to show the solution if the participant right-clicked 
their computer mouse and would record the number of times the participants right-clicked 
the mouse during the math problems. We also recorded the number of truthful attempts 
before participants right-clicked to see the solution.  The dependent measure of cheating 
was the number of times participants right-clicked the computer mouse to reveal the math 
solution.  Therefore, higher right-click counts indicate greater cheating.       
Helping Measure. We asked participants to evaluate a pamphlet for a fictitious 
non-profit organization, Pioneer Valley Survival Center (see Appendix F and G for 
pamphlet). The pamphlet described the Pioneer Valley Survival Center’s role in the 
community by providing meals, clothing, medical services, and outreach programs, and 
also noted that they continually looked for financial support for these programs.  After 
viewing the pamphlet for three minutes, participants used separate 7-point scales to 
evaluate whether the pamphlet was informative (1= “not at all informative” to 7 = 
“extremely informative”), attractive (1= “not at all attractive” to 7 = “extremely 
attractive”) and if the Pioneer Valley Survival Center served an important role in the 
community (1= “not at all important” to 7= “extremely important”).    
At the bottom of the evaluation form participants were informed that as part of the 
experiment they would be entered into a lottery to win $50. The researcher would select 
seven students to win $50 each, and participants were asked if they won the lottery 
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whether they would be willing to donate any of the $50 to the Pioneer Valley Suvival 
Center.  Participants filled out the lottery entry form at the bottom of the evaluation task 
with their name, contact information (e.g., phone number or email address), and the 
amount of money they would like to donate.  Participants removed the entry form and 
placed their own slip into a locked ballot box in the laboratory.  After data collection 
concluded, seven students were selected to win $50 each, and from this pool of money 
$130 was actually donated to the Northampton Surivival Center (265 Prospect Street 
Northampton, MA 01060). 
Moral Go/No-go Association Task (MGNAT). Participants completed the same 
MGNAT used in Study 2. The MGNAT measured implicit moral esteem via ease of 
association in number of errors (with fewer errors indicating greater association) when 
“moral” versus “immoral” words were associated with “self” versus “other.” 
Moral Dilemma Measure.  Using the same measure from Studies 1 and 2, 
participants evaluated 10 moral dilemmas involving immoral actions that produced moral 
outcomes. The reliabilities for the 10-item subscales of moral attitude, acceptability and 
likelihood judgments were .619, .685, and .633, respectively.  
Moralisms Scale (Janoff-Bulman, 2009).  Using the same measure from Studies 1 
and 2, participants evaluated 10 prescriptive (PreM) and 10 proscriptive (ProM) items. 
Only PreM and ProM moral weight ratings were recorded in Study 3 with reliabilities of 
.540 and .533, respectively.  
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Moral Esteem Scale. Using the same scale from Studies 1 and 2, explicit moral 
esteem was measured using the adapted Rosenberg (1962) Self-Esteem measure. The 
reliability for Moral Esteem was .8745.  
Procedure 
Participants took part in a study that consisted of three priming conditions 
followed by both cheating and helping behavioral tasks (counterbalanced). Participants 
also completed the MGNAT, Moral Dilemmas and Moralisms Scale, and standard 
demographics from Studies 1 and 2.  At the end of the study, participants were thanked 
for their involvement and given a debriefing document that explained the research goals.  
Results and Discussion 
The goal of Study 3 was to provide another test of the neglect pathway using 
actual behaviors of cheating and helping.  Following from hypothesis 2, we predicted 
high power participants, compared to low power and control would show increased 
proscriptive behavior (i.e., greater cheating on the computer task) and increased 
prescriptive behavior (i.e., larger donations on helping task). We believed this pattern of 
behavior would reflect powerholders’ activation of approach-based prescriptive behavior, 
while simultaneously minimizing the immorality of proscriptions and failing to inhibit 
these behaviors. 
Proscriptive Behavior 
Does power lead to increased cheating? To test this prediction we analyzed the 
computerized cheating task by creating several cheating indexes, including total cheating 
across the 20 math equations (i.e., total number scored as 1 – 20) and average number of 
                                                
5
 Consistent with Study 1 we did not find any group differences on explicit moral-esteem. 
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honest attempts before cheating (i.e., average number of incorrect answers submitted 
before right-clicking for the solution).  There were no condition effects for either total 
cheating, F(2, 138) = .507, p = .603, or average number of honest attempts before 
cheating, F(2, 42) =.989, p =.380.  Further, a chi-square test revealed that the power 
groups did not differ in their proportion of cheating, χ2 (3, N = 141) = 3.461, p =.177. 
Across all power conditions 31.9% cheated at least once while 68.1% completed the task 
honestly.  Moreover, for the 45 participants who cheated, the average number of times 
they cheated was 5.20, with no group differences.   
Prescriptive Behavior 
Does power lead to increased helping? We analyzed the pledged donation amount 
and the three rating items from the pamphlet evaluation task (informative, attractive, and 
important) to test this prediction.  
Prescriptions Predict Moral Judgments 
Given the previous finding that power groups differed in their donation amounts, 
we examined the interaction of power and donations6 on ratings of acceptability7, which 
was completed following the cheating and helping behaviors. We hypothesized that the 
combined effect of high power and higher donation (e.g., prescriptive behavior) would be 
associated with greater acceptance of immoral behavior. Hierarchical moderated multiple 
regression was used to predict acceptance of moral dilemma items.  In Step 1 the dummy 
                                                
6
 Donations were positively associated with PreM for all groups, as would be expected, 
and not with ProM.   
7 Unlike Studies 1 and 2, there was a marginal effect of power on acceptablity judgments, 
F(2,135) = 2.395, p = .095 with means for high power, low power, and control (Ms = 
3.35, 3.34, and 3.78, respectively).  Post hoc analyses reveal that high and low power 
were moderately different from control, but not from each other. It is important to note, 
however, that in this case the judgments followed actual behaviors (or restraint from 
behaviors) reflecting proscriptive and prescriptive morality. 
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coded variables for power condition and donation were entered. In Step 2 the interaction 
terms for donation by power condition were added. The control condition was treated as 
the reference group. The addition of the interaction terms at Step 2 indicated that the 
relationship between the acceptance scores and donations varied across the power 
conditions, ∆R2 = .038, F(2,117) = 3.238, p = .042.  As shown in Figure 5, the 
association between acceptance and donations is positive for the high power condition 
compared to low power and control groups. Simple slope analyses revealed that the 
regression line for high power is significantly different from control, b = -2.502, SE = 
.013, p = .014, and moderately different from low power, b= -1.708, SE = .013, p = .09. 
The finding that participants primed with power, who also pledged to give higher 
donations (e.g. prescriptive behavior), was associated with greater acceptance of immoral 
behavior provides additional support for the neglect pathway. We believe this pattern is a 
reflection of the relationship between power and approach-based morality that makes 
immoral behavior more acceptable. Conversely, for low power and control participants, 
the smaller the pledged donation the more accepting they were of immoral behaviors. 
Perhaps low power and control participants were attempting to normalize immoral 
behavior to take the focus off their own minimal donations. Importantly, in this research 
participant donations reflected donation intentions because students had not yet received 
any lottery winnings. Such altruistic intentions, rather than actual acts, may play an 
important role in the proscriptive behaviors (i.e., corruption) of high powerholders.   
The interaction between power, donations (e.g., moral-based behavior) and moral 
Donation amount was marginally different by power condition, F(2,138) =  2.587, p = 
.079 with participants in the low power group donating significantly less (M = $19.68) 
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than the high power and control groups (Ms were $26.33 and $27.79, respectively). In 
addition, evaluations that the survival center filled an important need in the community 
varied by power condition, F(2,139) = 5.372, p = .006, with low power participants rating 
the survival center as less important (M = 5.74) compared to high power (M = 6.38) and 
control (M = 6.21) participants. Further, ratings of pamphlet attractiveness were 
marginally different for power condition, F(2,137) = 2.624, p = .076; high power 
participants rated the pamphlet as most attractive (M = 4.26) compared to low power 
participants (M = 3.70) and control (M = 4.05).  All participants found the pamphlet to be 
equally informative, F(2,137) = .625, p = .537.  Interestingly, those low in power were 
the most withholding of donations as well as the harshest critics of the survival center’s 
importance. One possible explanation is that this reflects the relationship between low 
power and inhibition-based proscriptive morality, which shifts one’s focus to avoiding 
immorality rather than promoting morality.  As will be discussed below, more research 
needs to be done on low power and also points to the need for control groups (included 
here), so often not included in past research.  Judgments relates to current research on 
moral licensing (Monin & Miller, 2001).  Moral licensing suggests that individuals who 
engage in moral behaviors initially reward themselves with “moral credits” and, 
ironically, are more likely to engage in immoral behaviors afterward.  Therefore, moral 
licensing theory would predict that all participants (regardless of power condition) who 
intended to donate would be more accepting of immoral behavior because of moral 
credentialing.  However, in this research we did not find a main effect of moral licensing; 
instead, prescriptive intentions were more powerful (in terms of moral licensing) for high 
powerholders. This result underscores the unique interplay between power and morality.    
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Moral Self-Regard 
Study 3 also provided a second examination of the moral self-regard pathway as 
measured by the relationship between power and participants’ scores on the MGNAT. As 
in Study 2, we did not find a relationship between power and participants’ four 
association scores.  However, further examination of participant d’prime scores revealed 
significant order effects for self-immoral, other-moral, and other-immoral pairings.  That 
is, when participants completed the cheating task (e.g., before or after the helping task) 
influenced their implicit moral association scores.  For self-immoral pairings, participants 
who completed the cheating task directly prior to the MGNAT had significantly higher 
self-immoral association scores (M = 1.16) compared to those who donated directly prior 
to the MGNAT (M =.674),  F(1,139) = 17.776, p >.000. There was no effect for self-
moral pairings, which we believe is a reflection of the stability of self-moral associations.  
Nevertheless, participants regarded themselves as more immoral immediately after 
cheating. Similarly, other-immoral and other-moral association scores were strongest for 
those who cheated directly prior (M=1.122 and M=.575 respectively) compared to those 
who donated directly prior (M=.8433 and M=.575 respectively). Although these results 
go beyond the scope of the current studies, they do provide preliminary evidence for the 
sensitivity of the MGNAT as a tool to capture changes in implicit moral esteem.  
Study 3 provides further support for the neglect pathway and suggestive evidence 
that having power is associated with morally-based behaviors. Using actual behaviors, we 
found high power individuals who engaged in prescriptive acts like donating were more 
accepting of immoral behavior. We predicted, but did not find differences in actual 
cheating nor an effect of proscriptive behaviors (e.g., cheating) on moral judgments for 
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participants primed with power.  Moderated multiple regression analyses were run 
including cheating as a predictor of acceptability judgments, but none of the analyses 
were significant. Therefore, we concluded that cheating did not moderate the relationship 
between power and acceptability judgments. In this research participants had to activate 
cheating behavior (e.g., right-clicked mouse to reveal solution) rather than inhibit default 
cheating, used in previous studies.  Perhaps this modification to activate cheating rather 
than inhibit, actually suppressed the rate of overall cheating, which is why we were 
unable to find the predicted relationship between power and cheating. Further, 
participants completed this study in a room with two other participants and perhaps the 
public setting again suppressed cheating that might have occurred in private. Future 
research will refine the cheating paradigm to further test our prediction that cheating 
would increase for individuals primed with high power.  
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CHAPTER V 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
By bridging the power, self-regulation, and morality literatures we proposed that 
powerful individuals, because of their approach tendencies, are oriented more towards 
moral prescriptions or “shoulds” and thus focus more on moral acts and moral intentions 
while minimizing the importance of moral proscriptions (neglect pathway). We proposed 
an alternative pathway to corruption for powerholders via moral self-regard. 
Powerholders, because of their approach-based moral focus, would experience an 
automatic boost of implicit moral self-regard that would license future immorality.  In 
three studies we found supportive evidence for the neglect pathway (Studies 1 & 3), but 
not the moral self-regard pathway (Study 2).    
Past evidence for our hypotheses comes from consistent findings suggesting that 
power leads to increased approach tendencies, as demonstrated through increased action, 
positive affect, automatic cognition, risk taking, and socially inappropriate behavior 
(Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Galinsky, 
Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003).  In addition, we found suggestive evidence for our 
predictions from the positive social acts of corrupt individuals such as Eliot Spitzer and 
Bernard Madoff.  Eliot Spitzer was a proponent of same-sex marriage and voted to 
provide rights to illegal immigrants, while Bernard Madoff sat on the board of numerous 
charities and gave away millions of dollars.  Our theoretical model helps reconcile why 
these individuals simultaneously engaged in moral (prescriptive) and immoral 
(proscriptive) actions.  
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Across Studies 1 and 3 we found support for the neglect pathway as predicted by 
hypotheses one and two.  We expected individuals primed with power would be more 
accepting of immoral actions that led to moral outcomes, because their prescriptive moral 
focus increased their sensitivity to morality (rather than immorality).  Using the Moral 
Dilemma measure developed for this research, we combined immoral actions and moral 
outcomes, and found that participants primed with power were more accepting of 
proscriptive misdeeds for the sake of prescriptive good deeds compared to low power and 
control participants (Studies 1 and 2)8.  Interestingly, high powerholders were not higher 
on prescriptive morality in general – that is, they didn’t have higher PreM scores on the 
Moralism Scale (Study 1), nor did they donate more (Study 3).  However, greater 
acceptance of immorality was associated with higher PreM scores (Study 1) and 
donations (Study 3) only for those primed with power.  The interactions from Studies 1 
and 3 suggest the importance of enhanced prescriptive focus – that is, when their 
prescriptive morality is high (dispositionally or as a result of their own past actions or 
intentions), they are more apt to be accepting of proscriptive (immoral) behavior.  
We also proposed a second pathway to corruption involving enhanced moral-regard for 
powerholders.  This pathway was informed by past moral licensing research (Monin & 
Miller, 2001) that found participants who engaged in an initial moral act (e.g., non-biased 
hiring decision or buying environmentally friendly products) were more likely to engage 
in immoral behavior afterward because of a boost in moral self-regard. Following from 
this, hypothesis 3 predicted that high powerholders, because of their prescriptive moral 
                                                
8
 Unexpectedly, we only found a marginal effect of power on moral judgments in Study 
3. However, we attribute this effect to the inclusion of morally-based behaviors (cheating 
and donating) prior to the moral judgments.   
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focus, would experience an automatic boost of moral regard that would license 
immorality.  We used a new instrument developed by our lab to measure implicit moral 
esteem, Moral Go/No-go Association Task.  We expected high power participants to have 
stronger implicit association scores for “self” and “moral” pairings compared to all other 
word pairings (self-immoral, other-moral, other-immoral), with high power also having 
stronger associations on self-moral pairings compared to low power and control.   
However, we did not find support for the moral self-regard pathway (Study 2). Of 
note, we predicted that positive moral intentions alone—thoughts in the absence of 
deeds— would be powerful enough to elicit the automatic boost of moral regard, which 
we did not find.  This prediction was informed by self-other biases research by Pronin 
and Kugler (2007), which that suggests individuals overvalue thoughts and may ignore 
behavior when engaged in self-evaluations, validating their “good” selves with good 
intentions.  Interestingly, in Study 3, these intentions, specifically to donate future lottery 
winnings, were sufficient to produce greater acceptance of proscriptive immorality by 
those primed with high power. 
Although power did not relate to differences in implicit moral self-regard, high 
power was still associated with a focus on prescriptions, as shown through acceptability 
judgments, thereby providing additional support for the neglect pathway (Study 2). It 
appears that power may not automatically make one feel more moral, but it helps one 
focus on morality by prioritizing prescriptive moral outcomes.  A measure of moral 
esteem was included in all three studies, but there were no group differences, which we 
believe is a reflection of people’s strong tendency to see themselves as moral.  Bandura 
and colleagues’ work on moral disengagement (1996) found ordinary individuals who 
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engaged in detrimental behavior (e.g., harming another) still viewed their behavior as 
moral.  Moral disengagement helped keep moral-esteem intact, and may shed light on 
why we found a ceiling effect for explicit moral-esteem even after participants cheated in 
Study 3.  Future research should examine the relationship between power and moral 
esteem (implict and explicit) for those with real, not manipulated power.     
Overall, this research supports the conclusion that for powerholders the neglect 
pathway is the operative path by which power may lead to moral transgressions, a form 
of corruption.  In three studies we found suggestive evidence that the approach tendencies 
of powerholders maximized the role of good moral acts and intentions and minimized the 
impact of moral transgressions, because the individual’s monitoring system focused on 
and valued instances of moral successes (i.e., good behavior and intentions) rather than 
moral failures (i.e., bad behavior and intentions). We did not find support for the moral 
self-regard pathway, and therefore cannot conclude that moral esteem mediates the 
relationship between power and acceptance of immorality. The take home message from 
this project is that powerful individuals regulated their moral behavior by focusing 
primarily on prescriptions, “shoulds,” and less on proscriptions, “should nots,” and this 
paradoxically led to greater acceptance of immoral behavior.  
Limitations and Future Research 
Although this research project provides many insights into the relationship 
between power and morality, it is critical to extend this work to other samples of 
powerholders.  Will these results generalize to individuals in chronic positions of high 
power (e.g., business or political leaders)? Perhaps the degree of these effects is 
proportional to the amount of power one possesses.  Another issue closer to this project, 
  56 
is teasing apart the differences between high and low power.  In Study 3 we found that 
low power participants viewed the charitable organization more as a matter of personal 
preference rather than mandatory.  We did not predict this relationship and there is not 
much literature that speaks to the specific mechanisms for low power individuals; 
therefore future research would be well served to continue to include control groups, as in 
this project. There are important theoretical reasons to tease apart the low power 
construct, because the term may confound two very different experiences.  On the one 
hand, people low in power may know they are in a subordinate position, but may not 
desire or know how to change their situation.  Alternatively, those low in power may be 
aware of their status and also be motivated to change their position, but may not have the 
means or may be actively prevented from improving their position.  Another power state 
to consider, especially as it is relevant to organizational behavior, is “equivalent power” – 
that is, members working together on a project who have important implications for 
moral regulation. In extreme cases of corruption individuals often have partners (for 
example, Bernie Madoff’s lawyer Ira Sorkin), so sharing power may be another part of 
how moral regulation can lead to corruption.   
Another future direction for this research is to continually refine our test of power 
on implicit moral esteem.  One possibility is to increase the MGNAT time window from 
600ms to 750ms given that 600ms is extremely quick and may not accurately reflect 
attitude-based errors.  Past research by Nosek and Banaji (2001) supports this 
recommendation since they find that using response windows between 500 and 850ms 
accurately capture automatic attitudes. Further, using actual moral behaviors, not just 
intentions, might be the key to understanding how power may boost moral-regard.    
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It was surprising that we did not find any behavioral differences on cheating in Study 3.  
One possibility is that the situation of being in public, as well as our modification of the 
cheating task may have suppressed actual cheating behavior. Our cheating task was not 
an exact replication of previous methods (Vohs & Schooler, 2008), because we had 
individuals engage in cheating by right-clicking to reveal the solution compared to 
methods in which participants inhibited cheating by pressing the spacebar to stop the 
solution from being shown.  In this way, it may be more difficult to activate cheating as 
opposed to inhibiting it. Future research is needed to replicate the revised paradigm.  
Further, online samples could be used to provide an anonymous setting to facilitate 
cheating.    
Implications of Research 
Across three studies we tested whether power activated a type of moral regulation 
that might make powerholders more vulnerable to corruption. We predicted two possible 
paths to corruption, a neglect pathway and a moral self-regard pathway.  The neglect 
pathway involved power activating approach-based moral regulation that prioritized 
moral “shoulds” and deprioritized moral “should nots” making immoral transgressions 
more acceptable.  We found confirmation for this pathway in Studies 1 and 3 by 
manipulating participant power and measuring acceptance of immorality as well as 
preference for dispositional morality (PreM and ProM). Specifically, high power 
individuals were more accepting overall of immorality, and this relationship was 
amplified when individual PreM was added.  Study 3 provided an extension to Study 1 by 
including behaviors of cheating and helping prior to moral judgments. The inclusion of 
behaviors provided new insights into the joint effect of helping behavior and dispositional 
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morality; high powerholders who pledged higher donations (prescriptive behavior) were 
most accepting of immorality. The parallel nature of the findings from Studies 1 and 3 is 
particularly noteworthy.  High power combined with high prescriptive morality, either 
dispositionally (Study 1) or via positive intentions (Study 3), seems to be a recipe for 
greater immorality and corruption. 
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Table 1. Means for Prescriptive and Proscriptive Moralism Items (Study 1) 
 
 Prescriptive Preference Proscriptive Preference 
High Power 6.6 6.9 
Low Power 6.5 7.0 
Control 6.6 7.1 
 
 
 
 Prescriptive Moral Weight Proscriptive Moral Weight 
High Power 7.3 6.6 
Low Power 7.2 6.5 
Control 6.8 6.5 
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Table 2. Correlations Among PreM and ProM Scores and Acceptability Judgments By 
Power Condition (Study 1) 
 
High Power 
 Acceptability ProM 
PreM .215 .052 
ProM -.558** -- 
 
 
Low Power 
 Acceptability ProM 
PreM -.370** .372** 
ProM -.356** -- 
 
 
Control 
 Acceptability ProM 
PreM -.124 .206 
ProM -.415** -- 
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Figure 1. Conceptual Model of Power Illustrating Dual Pathways to Corruption 
Power Approach 
Focus on 
“Shoulds 
High 
MSR 
Moral 
Credit
Corruption
(High Moral Self-Regard Pathway) 
(Neglect Pathway) 
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Figure 2. Mean Difference for Acceptance of Immoral Behavior By Power Condition 
(Study 1) 
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Figure 3. Acceptance of Immoral Behavior as a Function of Power Condition and 
Prescriptive Morality (Study 1) 
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Figure 4. Mean Difference for Acceptance of Immoral Behavior By Power Condition 
(Study 2) 
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Figure 5. Acceptance of Immoral Behavior as a Function of Power Condition and 
Donation Amount (Study 3) 
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APPENDIX A 
NARRATIVE POWER PRIMING TASK 
High Power:  
Please recall a particular incident in which you had power over another individual or 
individuals.  By power, we mean a situation in which you controlled the ability of another 
person or persons to get something they wanted, or were in a position to evaluate those 
individuals.  Please describe this situation in which you had power – what happened, how 
you felt, etc.  
Low Power: 
Please recall a particular incident in which someone else had power over you.  By power, 
we mean a situation in which someone had control over your ability to get something you 
wanted, or was in a position to evaluate you.  Please describe this situation in which you 
did not have power – what happened, how you felt, etc.  
Control:  
Please recall what you did yesterday.  Please pick one situation from you day and 
describe what happened, how you felt, etc.  
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APPENDIX B 
MORAL DILEMMA MEASURE 
1. As a manager, you are approached by an employee to sponsor a charity event that 
will provide food and clothing for a local women’s shelter. You have already 
sponsored the maximum number of events allowed by your company, but you are 
still interested in finding a way to sponsor the event, so you consider using money 
from your department’s cash account. Although it violates company rules, you 
consider taking money from your department’s cash account to sponsor the charity 
event. 
 
Do you sponsor the charity event with money from the department's cash account? 
_______ Yes _______ No 
 
To what extent do you feel you should/should not use money from the department’s cash 
account to sponsor the charity event? 
 
feel very strongly                                                               feel very strongly                        
     should not                                            neutral                                                   should 
 1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
To what extent do you feel it is unacceptable/acceptable to use money from the 
department’s cash account (i.e., violate company policy) to sponsor the charity event? 
 
  completely                                        completely         
unacceptable                                           neutral                                         acceptable 
 1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
As the manager what is the likelihood that you would use the department’s cash account 
to sponsor the charity event? 
 
not at all                                             extremely               
    likely                                            neutral                                                 likely 
 1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
2. Your lifelong best friend is turning 21 on Saturday and you agreed to help your 
friends throw an elaborate surprise party. Your parents also planned a family 
dinner with distant relatives, who haven’t seen you in several years, for the same 
night. You can only attend one of the events on Saturday. Since there are only two 
other friends handling the elaborate birthday arrangements, you consider lying to 
your parents to get out of your family dinner. 
 
Do you lie to your parents to help your friends set up for the surprise party? 
_______ Yes _______ No 
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To what extent do you feel you should/should not lie to your parents to help your friends 
set up for the surprise party? 
 
feel very strongly                                                               feel very strongly                        
     should not                                              neutral                                                  should
 1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
To what extent do you feel it is unacceptable/acceptable to lie to your parents to help 
your friends set up for the surprise party? 
 
  completely                                        completely         
unacceptable                                             neutral                                       acceptable 
 1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
What is the likelihood that you would lie to your parents to help your friends set up for 
the surprise party? 
 
not at all                                             extremely               
    likely                                            neutral                                                 likely 
 1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
3. You need to get your spouse a present to celebrate your first wedding 
anniversary. You manage an electronics store in the mall, so you have access to 
special gifts your spouse will like, but you cannot afford. Coincidentally, you are 
scheduled to restock the store’s inventory the night before your anniversary, so it 
would be easy to take one of the products without paying. Although illegal, you 
consider taking the product to make your spouse happy on your anniversary. 
 
Do you steal merchandise from the store you manage to give your spouse a special gift on 
your first anniversary?    _______ Yes  _______ No 
 
To what extent do you feel you should/should not steal the merchandise from the store 
you manage to give your spouse a special gift on your first anniversary? 
 
feel very strongly                                                               feel very strongly                        
     should not                                              neutral                                                 should
 1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
To what extent do you feel it is unacceptable/acceptable to steal merchandise from the 
store you manage to give your spouse a special gift on your first anniversary? 
  completely                                        completely         
unacceptable                                             neutral                                       acceptable 
 1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
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What is the likelihood that you would steal the merchandise from the store you manage to 
give your spouse a special gift on your first anniversary? 
 
not at all                                             extremely               
    likely                                            neutral                                                 likely 
 1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
4. You work in the informational technology division of your company and are 
responsible for monitoring emails. You receive a help request from one of your 
friends to “unsend” an angry email to your boss that he intended to delete, but 
accidentally sent. Deleting emails is strictly prohibited and could cost you your job, 
but if the email is read by your boss it will likely result in your friend’s firing. 
 
Do you help your friend delete an email (i.e., violate company rules)?   _______ Yes  
_______ No 
 
To what extent do you feel you should/should not help your friend delete an email (i.e. 
violate company rules)? 
 
feel very strongly                                                               feel very strongly                        
     should not                                              neutral                                                 should
 1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
To what extent do you feel it is unacceptable/acceptable to help your friend delete an 
email (i.e. violate company rules)? 
 
  completely                                        completely         
unacceptable                                             neutral                                       acceptable 
 1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
What is the likelihood that you would help your friend delete an email (i.e. violate 
company rules)? 
 
not at all                                             extremely               
    likely                                            neutral                                                 likely 
 1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
5. A patient calls late Friday to inquire about a test result. You look up the patient’s 
file and see that his test results show he is healthy and needn’t worry all weekend. 
However, you are only a lab assistant and it is a violation of company policy for you 
to tell patients their test results. You consider telling the patient the results of their 
test even though it is a violation of company policy. 
 
Do you tell the patient their results (i.e., violate company policy)?     _______ Yes  
_______ No 
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To what extent do you feel you should/should not tell the patient their results (i.e., violate 
company policy)? 
 
feel very strongly                                                               feel very strongly                        
     should not                                              neutral                                                  should
 1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
To what extent do you feel it is unacceptable/acceptable to tell the patient their results 
(i.e., violate company policy)? 
 
  completely                                        completely         
unacceptable                                             neutral                                       acceptable 
 1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
What is the likelihood that you would tell the patient their results (i.e., violate company 
policy)? 
 
not at all                                             extremely               
    likely                                            neutral                                                 likely 
 1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
6. You run a local food bank which needs a van to deliver meals to the homebound 
members of your community. A used car dealer will donate one if you agree to 
provide a receipt for twice its real value. What do you do? 
 
Do you agree to provide a receipt for twice the real value of the donated van?     ______ 
Yes  _______ No 
 
To what extent do you feel you should/should not agree to provide a receipt for twice the 
real value of the donated van? 
 
feel very strongly                                                               feel very strongly                        
     should not                                              neutral                                                 should
 1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
To what extent do you feel it is unacceptable/acceptable to agree to provide a receipt for 
twice the real value of the donated van? 
 
  completely                                        completely         
unacceptable                                             neutral                                       acceptable 
 1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
What is the likelihood that you would agree to provide a receipt for twice the real value 
of the donated van? 
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      not at all                                             extremely               
    likely                                            neutral                                                 likely 
 1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
7. You are running a few errands for your grandparent and you are using their car, 
which has a handicapped license plate. The only convenient spot in the store 
parking lot is reserved for the handicapped. You’re in a hurry and won’t be there 
long. Do you park there? 
 
Do you park in the handicapped spot although you are not actually handicapped?      
  _______ Yes  _______ No 
 
To what extent do you feel you should/should not park in the handicapped spot although 
you are not actually handicapped? 
 
feel very strongly                                                               feel very strongly                        
     should not                                             neutral                                                   should
 1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
To what extent do you feel it is unacceptable/acceptable to park in the handicapped spot 
although you are not actually handicapped? 
 
  completely                                        completely         
unacceptable                                             neutral                                       acceptable 
 1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
What is the likelihood that you would park in the handicapped spot although you are not 
actually handicapped? 
 
not at all                                             extremely               
    likely                                            neutral                                                 likely 
 1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
8. Your wife is in labor and needs to get the hospital immediately. You approach a 
school zone and see that no one is outside. The school zone speed limit is clearly 
marked at 15 mph, but you are currently traveling at 45mph to get your wife to the 
hospital as quickly as possible. Do you to speed through the school zone even though 
it is against traffic laws?  
 
Do you speed through the school zone even though it is against traffic laws?       _______ 
Yes  _______ No 
 
To what extent do you feel you should/should not speed through the school zone even 
though it is against traffic laws? 
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feel very strongly                                                               feel very strongly                        
     should not                                            neutral                                                   should
 1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
To what extent do you feel it is unacceptable/acceptable to speed through the school zone 
even though it is against traffic laws? 
 
  completely                                        completely         
unacceptable                                             neutral                                       acceptable 
 1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
What is the likelihood that you would speed through the school zone even though it is 
against traffic laws? 
 
not at all                                             extremely               
    likely                                            neutral                                                 likely 
 1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9    
 
9. You are a doctor that specializes in pain management and one of your terminally 
ill patients takes a turn for the worse. The patient asks you to euthanize them to end 
their suffering, but euthanasia is outlawed in your state. Do you break the law to 
help end your patient’s continued suffering? 
 
Do you break the law to help end your patient’s continued suffering?     _______ Yes  
_______ No 
 
To what extent do you feel you should/should not break the law to help end your patient’s 
continued suffering? 
 
feel very strongly                                                               feel very strongly                        
     should not                                            neutral                                                   should
 1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
To what extent do you feel it is unacceptable/acceptable to break the law to help end your 
patient’s continued suffering? 
 
  completely                                        completely         
unacceptable                                             neutral                                       acceptable 
 1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
What is the likelihood that you would break the law to help end your patient’s continued 
suffering? 
 
not at all                                             extremely               
    likely                                            neutral                                                 likely 
 1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
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10. You unexpectedly got your high school girlfriend pregnant, you marry her and 
raise the child together. However, you are a high school dropout and are unable to 
find any jobs. To make ends meet you sell drugs out of your apartment. Although 
against the law, you consider continuing to sell drugs to support your family. What 
do you do? 
 
Do you continue to sell drugs to support your family?     _______ Yes  _______ No 
 
To what extent do you feel you should/should not continue to sell drugs to support your 
family? 
 
feel very strongly                                                               feel very strongly                        
     should not                                              neutral                                                  should
 1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
To what extent do you feel it is unacceptable/acceptable to continue to sell drugs to 
support your family? 
 
  completely                                        completely         
unacceptable                                            neutral                                        acceptable 
 1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
What is the likelihood that you would continue to sell drugs to support your family? 
 
not at all                                             extremely               
    likely                                            neutral                                                 likely 
 1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9  
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APPENDIX C 
MORALISMS SCALE 
Some decisions are “up to you”---there isn’t a clear right or wrong answer, or a better or 
worse choice.  One such decision might be choosing a flavor of ice cream.  Such 
decisions are completely a matter of personal preference.  Other decisions, such as killing 
an innocent person, are clearly matters of right or wrong behavior and not matters of 
personal preference. 
 
For each situation described below first please indicate (i.e., circle the number) the degree 
to which you think the decision is a matter of personal preference.  Then indicate how 
strongly you feel the person in the scenario should or should not engage in the behavior 
presented.  There are no correct answers, so please just choose the number on the scales 
below that best represents your response. 
 
1. Tim is overweight and has already eaten two hamburgers and a large order of 
fries.  He is full, but he really likes the onion rings at the restaurant, so he considers 
ordering a third burger and an order of onion rings. 
 
To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference? 
not at all a matter of                                                                                        completely a matter of  
personal preference                                                                                            personal preference 
         1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
To what extent do you feel Tim should or should not order the third burger and onion rings? 
feel very strongly                                                                    feel very strongly                       
he should not                                     neutral                                                    he should 
         1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
2. Stacy is a pre-med student and has an early morning chemistry class.  She intends 
to go to class, but finds it hard to get up early.  She could just miss class and get the 
notes from other students, but considers waking up early anyway to get to class on 
time.   
 
To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference? 
not at all a matter of                                                                                        completely a matter of  
personal preference                                                                                            personal preference 
         1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
To what extent do you feel Stacy should get up, attend class, and take the notes herself? 
feel very strongly                                                                    feel very strongly                       
she should not                                     neutral                                                   she should 
         1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
3. Susan has a large friendly dog who likes to run free.  There is a leash law in her 
town that states dogs should be leashed in public, but Susan is thinking of letting her 
dog run free on the bike trail in town.   
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To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference? 
not at all a matter of                                                                                        completely a matter of  
personal preference                                                                                            personal preference 
         1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
To what extent do you feel Susan should or should not let her dog run free on the bike trail in 
town? 
feel very strongly                                                                    feel very strongly                       
she should not                                     neutral                                                    she should 
         1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
4. Mary walks by a homeless man on the street, and he asks if she can spare some 
change.  There’s a local shelter that costs $2.00 a night that Mary knows about.  
Mary could just walk past the homeless man, but considers giving him the $2.00 
instead. 
 
To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference? 
not at all a matter of                                                                                        completely a matter of  
personal preference                                                                                            personal preference 
         1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
To what extent do you feel Mary should or should not give the homeless man money?  
feel very strongly                                                                    feel very strongly                       
she should not                                     neutral                                                     she should 
         1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
5. Jill is applying for a competitive year-long internship.  Her uncle knows someone 
at the firm that is offering the internship.  Jill could ask her uncle to pull strings for 
her, but she considers instead working hard on her application and trying to get the 
position on her own merits. 
 
To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference? 
not at all a matter of                                                                                        completely a matter of  
personal preference                                                                                            personal preference 
         1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
To what extent do you feel Jill should work hard on her application and try to get the position on 
her own merits?  
feel very strongly                                                                    feel very strongly                       
she should not                                     neutral                                                     she should 
         1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
6. Cory is in the supermarket, where he sees an elderly woman having trouble 
carrying her groceries. He is in a hurry and knows he could ignore her, but 
considers instead helping the elderly woman carry her groceries. 
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To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference? 
not at all a matter of                                                                                        completely a matter of  
personal preference                                                                                            personal preference 
         1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
To what extent do you feel Cory should or should not help the elderly woman with her groceries?  
feel very strongly                                                                    feel very strongly                       
he should not                                     neutral                                                     he should 
         1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
7. Justin is a student artist and likes to paint graffiti in public areas, even though the 
city’s policy prohibits it.  He believes people like his work, and while waiting alone 
in a subway station, Justin considers painting some colorful graffiti on a blank wall 
in the station.   
 
To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference? 
not at all a matter of                                                                                        completely a matter of  
personal preference                                                                                            personal preference 
         1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
To what extent do you feel Justin should or should not paint some colorful graffiti on a blank wall 
in the station? 
feel very strongly                                                                    feel very strongly                       
he should not                                     neutral                                                    he should 
         1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
8. Chris needs one more math course to complete his college requirements.  He is 
taking a math course that is much too easy for him, because he has already been 
taught all the material in another class.  He considers taking a more difficult course 
that would challenge him and teach him something new.  
 
To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference? 
not at all a matter of                                                                                        completely a matter of  
personal preference                                                                                            personal preference 
         1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
To what extent do you feel Chris should or should not take a more difficult math course?  
feel very strongly                                                                    feel very strongly                       
he should not                                     neutral                                                     he should 
         1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
9. Sam really likes pornography on the web.  He already spent two hours earlier in 
the day on an online pornography site.  He just returned to his apartment and 
considers immediately going online to a pornography website. 
 
To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference? 
not at all a matter of                                                                                        completely a matter of  
personal preference                                                                                            personal preference 
         1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
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To what extent do you feel Sam should or should not immediately go online to a pornography 
website? 
feel very strongly                                                                    feel very strongly                       
he should not                                     neutral                                                    he should 
         1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
10. Ellen moved to the city and is staying with a friend, who says she is welcome to 
stay until she finds her own apartment. Ellen’s friend works long hours and is 
rarely at home.  Ellen could just put off finding her own place to live, but considers 
looking for one as soon as she can.  
 
To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference? 
not at all a matter of                                                                                        completely a matter of  
personal preference                                                                                            personal preference 
         1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
To what extent do you feel Ellen should or should not start looking for her own apartment?  
feel very strongly                                                                    feel very strongly          
she should not                                     neutral                                                    she should 
         1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
11. Melanie and Scott have just bought a house in a quiet, middle-class 
neighborhood.  The homes are not fancy, but are modest and well-kept. Melanie and 
Scott are considering ignoring the community and painting their house bright 
orange with green trim. 
 
To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference? 
not at all a matter of                                                                                        completely a matter of  
personal preference                                                                                            personal preference 
         1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
To what extent do you feel Melanie and Scott paint their house bright orange with green trim? 
feel very strongly                                                                    feel very strongly                       
they should not                                     neutral                                                    they should 
         1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
12. Brenda and Dan just finished an expensive dinner at a fine local restaurant.  The 
bill is accurate, but is far more expensive than they thought it would be.  The waiter 
was good.  Brenda and Dan know they could just leave a small tip, but consider 
spending more money to give the waiter an appropriate larger amount. 
 
To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference? 
not at all a matter of                                                                                        completely a matter of  
personal preference                                                                                            personal preference 
         1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
To what extent do you feel Brenda and Dan should or should not leave the waiter a good tip? 
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feel very strongly                                                                    feel very strongly                       
they should not                                     neutral                                                     they should 
         1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
13. Linda had a great time with Bob.  When they go back to her apartment, it’s 
clear she and Bob want to have sex.  Neither of them have contraceptive protection, 
but they consider having sex anyway. 
 
To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference? 
not at all a matter of                                                                                        completely a matter of  
personal preference                                                                                            personal preference 
         1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
To what extent do you feel Linda and Bob should or should not have sex anyway?  
feel very strongly                                                                    feel very strongly                       
they should not                                     neutral                                                     they should 
         1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
14. Jason has a big project to complete for an important client, and it is due by the 
end of the day.  He knows he could give the work to two new interns, but he 
considers staying late and doing a good job finishing the project himself.   
 
To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference? 
not at all a matter of                                                                                        completely a matter of  
personal preference                                                                                            personal preference 
         1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
To what extent do you feel Jason should or should not stay late and finish the project himself? 
feel very strongly                                                                    feel very strongly                       
he should not                                     neutral                                                    he should 
         1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
15. Sheila is going to a funeral, and it’s an unusually hot day. She is thinking of 
wearing a skimpy, revealing dress to keep her relatively cool at the funeral.  
 
To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference? 
not at all a matter of                                                                                        completely a matter of  
personal preference                                                                                            personal preference 
         1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
To what extent do you feel Sheila should or should not wear a skimpy, revealing dress to the 
funeral?  
feel very strongly                                                                    feel very strongly                       
she should not                                     neutral                                                     she should 
         1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
16. Brian loves to gamble and particularly likes going to the racetrack.  He’s been 
on a losing streak and knows he should quit his habit, but he just got his paycheck 
and considers going back to the track to gamble. 
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To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference? 
not at all a matter of                                                                                        completely a matter of  
personal preference                                                                                            personal preference 
         1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
To what extent do you feel Brian should or should not go back to the track?  
feel very strongly                                                                    feel very strongly                       
he should not                                     neutral                                                     he should 
         1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
17. While on campus, Jay is approached by a student asking if he could volunteer 
two hours this weekend to help with a food drive for the local survival center.  Jay 
doesn’t have plans for the weekend. Jay is deciding whether to commit himself to 
helping with the food drive. 
 
To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference? 
not at all a matter of                                                                                        completely a matter of  
personal preference                                                                                            personal preference 
         1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
To what extent do you feel Jay should or should not help with a food drive for the local survival 
center? 
feel very strongly                                                                    feel very strongly                       
he should not                                     neutral                                                    he should 
         1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
Sarah is getting more and more into debt with her credit card.  She recently bought 
lots of expensive new clothes and costly furniture for her apartment. She could start 
saving her money but instead is thinking of buying a very expensive hi-definition TV 
and going into even deeper debt. 
 
To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference? 
not at all a matter of                                                                                        completely a matter of  
personal preference                                                                                            personal preference 
         1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
To what extent do you feel Sarah should or should not buy the TV and go into greater debt?  
feel very strongly                                                                    feel very strongly                       
she should not                                     neutral                                                   she should 
         1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
19. Dana is cleaning out her closet and finds her old American flag.  She has no need 
for the flag anymore, so she is thinking of cutting it up into small pieces that she can 
use as rags to clean her house. 
 
To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference? 
not at all a matter of                                                                                        completely a matter of  
personal preference                                                                                            personal preference 
         1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
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To what extent do you feel Dana should or should not cut the American flag into pieces to be 
used as rags? 
feel very strongly                                                                    feel very strongly                       
she should not                                     neutral                                                   she should 
         1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
20. Ned inherited a lot of money and has cut back on work to manage his 
investments.  He is approached by a foundation that that has been successful at 
setting up job-training for the poor and is in need of additional funding. Ned is 
trying to decide whether to donate money for the foundation 
 
To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference? 
not at all a matter of                                                                                        completely a matter of  
personal preference                                                                                            personal preference 
         1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
To what extent do you feel Ned should or should not donate money to the foundation? 
feel very strongly                                                                    feel very strongly                       
he should not                                     neutral                                                    he should 
         1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9   
 
 
 
 
PROSCRIPTIVE items:  1, 3, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19  
 
PRESCRIPTIVE items:  2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 17, 20  
 
(Note: To make the Proscriptive and Prescriptive should/should not scales comparable, 
subtract the Proscriptive scores from 10.  The Proscriptive and Prescriptive personal 
preference scores are comparable as is.)   
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APPENDIX D 
PAMPHLET EVALUATION TASK 
We are interested in getting your feedback for the Pioneer Survival Center pamphlet.  
There are no correct answers, so please just choose the number on the scales below that 
best represents your response. 
1. How informative was the pamphlet?
Not at all    Extremely  
informative    informative 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. How visually attractive was the pamphlet? 
Not at all     Extremely 
attractive       attractive 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. To what extent do you think the Pioneer Survival Center fills an important need in the 
community?  
Not at all    Extremely  
important    important 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Thank you! 
As thanks for completing this task you will be entered into a lottery.  The lottery 
will select seven (7) students who will each win $50.  Please fill out and detach the entry 
form below.  Place you completed submission in the box marked “Lottery.” 
Name: _________________________________________________    
Contact info (e-mail/telephone): ____________________________________________ 
If you win this $50 lottery how much of the total would you be willing to donate to the 
Pioneer Survival Center? (We would deduct this amount from the check we send you.) 
$________
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APPENDIX E 
MORAL SELF ESTEEM 
 
1.  I feel that I’m a person of moral worth, at least on an equal plane with others. 
 
Strongly Disagree            Strongly Agree 
1        2         3        4      5    6  7 
  
2.  I feel that I have a number of good moral qualities. 
 
Strongly Disagree            Strongly Agree 
1        2         3        4      5    6  7 
 
3.  All I all, I am inclined to feel that I am a moral failure. 
 
Strongly Disagree            Strongly Agree 
1        2         3        4      5    6  7 
 
4.  When it comes to morality, I feel I do not have much to be proud of. 
 
Strongly Disagree            Strongly Agree 
1        2         3        4      5    6  7 
 
5.  I take a positive attitude toward my moral self. 
 
Strongly Disagree            Strongly Agree 
1        2         3        4      5    6  7 
 
6.  When it comes to morality, on the whole I am satisfied with myself. 
 
Strongly Disagree            Strongly Agree 
1        2         3        4      5    6  7 
 
7.  I wish I could have more respect for my moral self. 
 
Strongly Disagree            Strongly Agree 
1        2         3        4      5    6  7 
 
8.  At times I think I am not morally good at all. 
 
Strongly Disagree            Strongly Agree 
1        2         3        4      5    6  7 
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APPENDIX F 
HELPING BEHAVIOR MEASURE (FRONTSIDE OF PAMPHLET)
The Pioneer Survival Center is 
an emergency food pantry 
that provides low-income 
individuals and families with 
free food, clothing, personal 
care items, and referrals for 
emergency assistance. The 
Center distributes over 
650,000 pounds of food each 
year.
PIONEER 
SURVIVAL 
CENTER
PIONEER 
SURVIVAL 
CENTER
Our Mission
The Pioneer Survival Center 
strives to improve the quality of 
life for low-income individuals and 
families in by providing food and 
other resources with dignity and 
respect.
The Pioneer Survival Center opened in 
November of 1979.  The initial funding 
for the Center came from community 
donations.
From the minute it opened its doors, the 
Survival Center fulfilled a long-standing 
need: distributing food to people in 
emergency situations and to help people 
with low-incomes who require 
assistance in making ends meet on a 
short term basis. Clothing and 
household items were available in the 
earliest days.
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APPENDIX G 
HELPING BEHAVIOR MEASURE (BACKSIDE OF PAMPHLET) 
The PSC is a non-Profit organization. 
Donations of money are the lifeblood of 
The Survival Center. Unlike donations of 
food that rely upon scarce storage 
space, your financial contributions can 
be put to immediate use in buying food 
when the need is greatest, and at the 
best value when buying salvage, on sale, 
or in bulk. Money is also needed to pay 
salaries, maintain the building, buy 
gasoline for the truck, and keep our 
refrigerators running. Contributions of 
any size are gratefully received and are 
fully tax-deductible.
 
VOLUNTEER
The Pioneer Survival Center’s dedicated 
volunteer community plays an integral role 
in our 32-year success providing food and 
other resources to low-income individuals 
and families with dignity and respect.
Kids’ Summer Food 
Program: 
During the summer months, the Pioneer Survival 
Center’s Kids’ Summer Food Program provides 
eligible children with free food packages to help feed 
them breakfast and lunch every weekday for ten 
weeks during summer vacation. Every eligible child in 
the household can receive a pre-bagged package of 
food which includes dry milk, cereal, fruit, juice, peanut 
butter, jelly, mac & cheese, tuna, soup, and vegetables. 
Turkeys: During the month of November, the 
Survival Center distributes either a turkey or grocery 
store gift card to each client family when they come in 
for their regular package of groceries. We also try to 
have other traditional Thanksgiving items available 
such as potatoes, cranberry and squash.
Other Resources: 
Personal Care Items, Pet Food, Job Training
Client Comments
I appreciate the wonderful, kind 
volunteers, the fact the place exists for 
help with food and clothes, the 
patience, amiableness and warmth with 
the people here and their aim to 
accommodate.
The food provided some months makes 
the difference between hunger and 
eating. The center has also acted as a 
networking tool for access to other 
needed services. The staff is friendly 
and helpful.
DONATE
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